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The 2003 Administrative Law Conference
By Randolph J.May1
Under the leadership of ourSection Chair Bill Funk,andwith the help of many Section
members and especially our Section
Director,Kimberly Knight, this year’s
2003 Administrative Law Conference
was a resounding success.The November
6-7 conference,with around 600 atten-
dees,was the most well-attended event
ever held by the Section.Thanks are due
once again to the following conference
sponsors:Cadwalader,Wickersham &Taft
LLP;Duane Morris Foley & Lardner;
Jenner & Block;Kirkland & Ellis LLP;
Piper Rudnick LLP;Porter Wright
Morris & Arthur LLP;Ropes & Gray;
Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP;and
Wilmer,Cutler & Pickering.Without
their generous support, it would have
been difficult to put together a confer-
ence with such an array of outstanding
educational programs and delightful
social and networking events.
We were fortunate to have with us on
the program a large number of promi-
nent government officials.Here’s a
sampling of some edited speech excerpts.
For the complete text of these addresses,
which are worth reading in full, and for
links to the other CLE programs,go to
the Section’s website.And don’t forget to
mark your calendars for next Fall’s
Conference to be held on October
21–22.
From the opening
keynote address by
John D.Graham,
Administrator,Office
of Information and
Regulatory Affairs,
Office of Management
and Budget:
In order to
accomplish smarter
regulation,we have
launched three major initiatives.They do
not involve any new legislation;no
executive orders and no campaigns for
regulatory relief.They involve more
openness in deliberation,better regula-
tory analysis, and higher quality technical
information for use by regulators.
While openness is good government,
it has also been a useful tactic in helping
shift the public debate on regulation.The
debate is moving away from process
toward substance, from “who met with
whom”? to “is this option more cost-
effective than that option?” I believe that
is a good development for public policy.
While I am an advocate of more
openness at OMB,there are limits to
openness.For example, I have no inten-
tions of compromising the ability of my
career staff to have candid discussions
with professionals from the regulatory
agencies.
Second,we have also established more
rigorous standards for what we expect
from agencies in the way of regulatory
analysis...I am talking about basic things
such as cost-effectiveness analysis, formal
probability analysis, and careful consider-
ation of qualitative and intangible values.
Third,we have sought to expand the
“information policy” function at OIRA
to include the technical quality of infor-
mation that agencies disseminate to the
public.
1 Conference Chair and Section Chair-Elect
John D. Graham
Court of Federal Claims reception hosts, clockwise from top left: Senior Judge John Paul
Wiese, Chief Judge Edward J. Damich, Senior Judge Loren A. Smith , Judge Susan G.
Braden, Federal Circuit Judge Pauline Newman, Judge Mary Ellen Coster Williams.
continued on page 14
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Libel by Website: Federal Agency Liability
for False Website Statements
By James T. O’Reilly1
‘‘To err is human, and toforgive divine.”“The kingcan do no wrong.”“Every-
body makes mistakes.”Our culture
recognizes that errors sometimes occur,
yet our legal structure denies a remedy
for many federal agency errors.The
internet has made some small errors
gigantic by broadcasting flawed infor-
mation which is, in effect, unable to be
timely rebutted or retracted.Federal
agencies that publish or post on the web
statements that libel private persons or
entities can cause serious harm,with
virtual impunity to consequences.
This article explores the inability to
obtain collective or individual punish-
ment against agencies and their
employees for libelous statements.The
effects of such libels may be devastating
upon a person or organization,but a
“discretionary function”of the agency to
make the pronouncement,or the Federal
Torts Claims Act’s exclusion of inten-
tional torts such as libel, leaves the
wounded private person with no
remedy.Only in a few cases of congres-
sional intervention and Court of Federal
Claims involvement has there been
compensation for severe harm caused by
agency misstatements or unjustified criti-
cisms.From the agency operational
viewpoint, the present state of law is just
fine; they need fear no liability, and only
rarely has Congress given a mandate or
an incentive to make corrections after
errors occur.
No APA Remedy
The Administrative Procedure Act of
1946 does not provide remedies for
adverse publicity such as erroneous
website postings.The Act provides for
review of final agency actions, and the
lack of official finality to agency state-
ments such as website postings is the
principal barrier to remedial efforts.The
APA does not contemplate aggrieved
persons obtaining judicial review of an
agency’s choice to place its staff ’s
comments,other agency reports,private
sector comments or other statements
into the website.So these inclusions in
the website,other than statements
contained in final rules or adjudicative
decisions,cannot be addressed by the
typical APA review lawsuit.The inclusion
on the website of a misleading criticism
or false accusation of a private person is
not the official decision of the agency in
a matter; it may be the staff ’s view but
carries no finality and has no estoppel
effect against the agency.The false or
misleading statement would require a
denial of a license or adoption of a rule
based on the false or erroneous state-
ment,before the agency will have taken a
“final agency action” subject to judicial
review.Beyond finality, agencies which
create a correction mechanism may also
defend on the basis that the offended
person must exhaust that internal
remedy before litigating.
Data Quality Act
The Data Quality Act correction process
adopted in agency rules in October 2002
has not had much of an impact to deter
agency errors.A tiny handful of correc-
tive actions have been instituted;but after
much discussion of potential impacts,no
apparent transformation has occurred in
agency attitudes and practices.Agencies
that care to create voluntary website
correction mechanisms,or to empower
ombuds to help correct errors, are to be
commended.But their self-corrective
initiatives are neither compelled by
statute nor essential to defending the
agency against a high risk of tort liability.
Past History
The litigated cases that have sought
relief against agency errors demonstrate
that agencies have won virtually all
disputes,even where the agency was
inaccurate or lax in its research of the
disputed statement.Relief has come only
when Congress specifically waives the
doctrine of sovereign immunity by
statute and refers the case to the Court of
Federal Claims for determination of
damages.This relative handful of
reported cases is a symptom of the frus-
tration with lack of remedies, and is not a
product of perfection by federal agency
publicists or webmasters.Details of the
litigation can be found in a 2003 ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW article.2
Why Not a Damages Remedy?
The rationale for not creating a damages
litigation cause of action for libelous
statements appears compelling.First, the
abuse potential for policy correction
disputes is great.The dissenting voice
aiming at the agency message might
complain in order to promote a different
policy outcome that would be
“corrected” in favor of the party who
lost the adjudicated case.Second, the
resource commitment of a corrections
process is evident; agencies have no addi-
tional staff for handling corrections, so
the same employees who are operating a
program could be distracted to the
mission of defending their website’s
subjective accuracy.The process of adopt-
ing a regulation may be delayed by
1Visiting Professor of Law,University of
Cincinnati College of Law; former Section
Chair and Current Chair of the Publications
Committee.
2 Prof. James O’Reilly,Libels on Government
Websites:Exploring Remedies for Federal Internet
Defamation, 55 ADMIN.L.REV.507 (2003).
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forcing the same staff members to draft
the rule and then to defend it against
critics of its “errors,”with the criticism
against the agency attributable to policy
disagreements.Third, some agencies
might fear making pronouncements of a
controversial nature,or fear listing infor-
mation about controversial public issues
that are likely to draw challenges.Fourth,
the historical or technical accuracy of
some information is judgmental and ripe
for debate, so the measure of what is
“incorrect”may be quite subjective.
Post-Internet Mechanisms
The correction of a belatedly acknowl-
edged error that has already been posted
to the agency website is especially chal-
lenging.The data or the entire report may
already have been re-broadcast as news or
cited in an op-ed advocacy article some-
where.Speed in responding to challenges
is essential.The better agencies have teams
of correction specialists who can rapidly
take the challenged page off-line,or flag it
with a cautionary statement.The Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency error
correction team, for example,has a proto-
col for the handling of complaints about
inaccuracies in the EPA’s huge Enviro-
facts data base.This technical capability
must be augmented by a commitment of
program managers to examine the chal-
lenge and make the substantive decision
to alter or withdraw if the information
has been shown to be incorrect.
What Should Agencies Do?
Agency managers are stewards of the
credibility of the federal government, and
their responsible actions to assure accu-
racy of their data deserve commendation.
Agencies which host large internet data
resources should examine the quality of
their incoming data sources, screening out
by protocol or individual selection that set
of data that is likely to be of questionable
validity. (The agency’s Freedom of Infor-
mation Act obligations are separate from
this concern for data quality;FOIA
release obligations come with no
warranty or agency imprimatur,but
programs of affirmative disclosure or
pronouncements inherently involve such
a selectivity.)
The agency website and its publications
should carry a notice that requests for
corrections can be addressed to the desig-
nated office which will process the
requests and provide a response. If the
agency wishes to avoid litigation, it may
frequently negotiate for the correction of
the disputed data,even where the Data
Quality Act does not mandate such
action.By analogy, the 1974 Privacy Act
allows statements of disagreement to be
placed with the disputed record for a
future release, so an alternative resolution
of a dispute over accuracy might be to
expand the fields of data entry to allow a
“flag” to indicate that an additional state-
ment is available which takes issue with
the selected agency statement.
Ultimately,Congress may debate the
wisdom of expanding the Data Quality
Act to form a corrections mechanism for
federal agency statements made in print
and electronic media. If such a mecha-
nism were in place, aligned with limited
judicial review of the decision, the credi-
bility of agencies would certainly benefit
from the availability of the new assurances
of data accuracy.
PARALYZED VETERANS OF AMERICA
Takes Pleasure in Announcing its First 
LEGAL WRITING COMPETITION
Topic
Prize 
Should members of the Board of Veterans’Appeals be required to qualify as
administrative law judges?
Separate “Student” and “Professional” categories have been established. Cash prizes
and publication assistance are available for winning entries on both sides of the issue
in each category.
The BVA is the final appellate decision-maker for the Department of Veterans Affairs and adjudi-
cates approximately 35,000 appeals every year. There are approximately 2,000 appeals annually
taken from the BVA to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and over half of those appeals
are typically remanded back to the BVA for correction of errors and further adjudication.
For details, please visit www. pva.org  •  Entries are due in February 2004
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Environmental regulation as weknow it is essentially reactive innature.By focusing on pollution
control and risk management, environ-
mental policy is largely limited to
responding to pollutants after they are
created.The industrial production
process is viewed as a black box, and
regulation aims to capture the air emis-
sions,wastewater discharges and other
contaminants, and subsequently treat,
burn or bury them.Rarely do regula-
tors attempt to intervene in the
production process to require businesses
to eliminate the pollution before it
occurs; that is, to require pollution
prevention.
Many within government and indus-
try are troubled by the notion of
government-mandated pollution
prevention, typically raising two argu-
ments against reaching within the black
box.First, it is often argued that current
laws and regulations do not provide EPA
and other regulators with a clear
mandate to regulate the production
process.Second,opponents of manda-
tory pollution prevention also contend
that regulators lack the technical and
business knowledge, skills and resources
needed to exercise it effectively. In other
words,when it comes to pollution
prevention, industry knows best.
This article contends that experience
with the implementation of the Clean
Air Act’s air toxics program-particularly
in Southern California-proves both
arguments to be wide of the mark. In
fact,when one looks carefully at the
language and intent of that program, it is
clear that EPA has both the authority
and the obligation to directly regulate the
production process, in appropriate cases.
And while businesses obviously know a
great deal about their production
processes, research in management and
organizational theory teaches us that
business firms often lack the time, infor-
mation and inclination to alter those
processes in beneficial ways absent exter-
nal stimuli.Recent rulemaking by the
South Coast Air Quality Management
District demonstrates how government
can effectively provide such stimulus.We
deal with each of these two points in
turn.
EPA’s Authority and Obligation. 
EPA has consistently taken the position
that pollution prevention is best left to
the voluntary efforts of industry,which is
occasionally nudged along by various
financial incentives offered by the
government.Take the case of the Pollu-
tion Prevention Act of 1990 (the
“PPA”),which,among other things,
established a pecking order among alter-
native regulatory approaches such as
treatment, land disposal, recycling and
pollution prevention.The PPA directs
federal regulators to favor pollution
prevention approaches over traditional
pollution control strategies,yet EPA has
viewed this mandate of the PPA as aspi-
rational rather than binding.
EPA has similarly ignored explicit
statutory language in the Clean Air Act
(CAA) requiring consideration and
inclusion (where appropriate) of pollu-
tion prevention in the regulation of
hazardous air pollutants (“HAPs”).The
Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia took EPA to task for this
narrow focus on pollution control in
National Lime Ass’n v.Environmental
Protection Agency,233 F.3d 625 (D.C.Cir.
2000),emphasizing that EPA has not
only the authority but also the obligation
to consider and mandate pollution
prevention where technically feasible.
National Lime focused on Section 112 of
the Clean Air Act,which creates the
federal program for reducing emissions
of HAPs.Under Section 112(d) (2), for
each regulated industry sector,EPA must
establish emission standards for HAPs
based on the maximum achievable
control technology (or “MACT”),
including a prohibition on emissions if
achievable.MACT includes traditional
pollution control technologies that
capture pollutants and either treat or
contain them.However, the statute also
defines MACT broadly to include the
measures which “reduce the volume of,
or eliminate emissions of, [HAPs]
through process changes, substitution of
materials,or other modifications.”CAA
Section 112(d) (2) (A).
In National Lime, the Sierra Club chal-
lenged EPA’s failure to set emission
standards for several hazardous air pollu-
tants emitted from cement
manufacturing plants.EPA justified its
inaction by arguing that emission stan-
dards need only be based on the
pollution control technology currently
in use in the industry.Thus,contended
EPA, if no existing sources currently
control emissions of a given pollutant,
then EPA need not set a “MACT” stan-
dard for that pollutant.The court
rejected EPA’s argument,holding that
the absence of an existing control tech-
nology did not relieve the agency of its
clear statutory obligation to set emission
standards for each hazardous air pollutant
emitted from the source. In reaching that
conclusion, the court relied in part on a
Senate Report that stated:
The technologies,practices or strategies
which are to be considered in setting
emission standards under this subsection
go beyond the traditional end-of-stack
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treatment or abatement system.The
Administrator [of EPA] is to give priority
to technologies or strategies which
reduce the amount of pollution generated
through process changes or the substitu-
tion of materials less hazardous.Pollution
prevention is to be the preferred strategy
wherever possible.233 F.3d at 634 (citing
S.REP.NO.101-128,at 168 (1989)).
Lack of a mandate? At least with
respect to the federal air toxics program,
there can be little doubt that EPA has the
legal authority to peer through the walls
of the black box. Indeed, the agency has
the obligation to do so.The harder ques-
tion is how the agency can exercise its
authority so as to ensure the creation and
diffusion of pollution prevention tech-
nologies without harming the regulated
businesses.One answer to that question
can be found in the dry cleaning sector.
Regulation and TAO in 
Southern California
Despite the clear language in the statute
and the legislative history,EPA rarely
incorporates pollution prevention meas-
ures in its regulations under the federal
air toxics program.Although the agency
provides various explanations in different
circumstances,one general theme
running through EPA’s preamble discus-
sions focuses on the lack of mature,
generally available pollution prevention
technologies. In other words,EPA is
reluctant to ask business to alter or
replace established production processes
with unproven alternative “clean” tech-
nologies. In California, the South Coast
Air Quality Management District
(“AQMD”) used a unique approach to
surmount this obstacle in the context of
the dry cleaning industry:AQMD played
an active role in evaluating and ulti-
mately demonstrating the commercial
viability of an emerging alternative tech-
nology.
First, a bit of background.Most profes-
sional drycleaners use perchloroethylene
(“PCE”), a toxic chemical, as their
primary cleaning solvent. In a compre-
hensive study of toxic air emissions in
the South Coast region,AQMD
concluded that PCE emissions from dry
cleaning operations are a major source of
toxic exposures in the urban environ-
ment.Consequently, in its 2001 Air
Toxics Control Plan,AQMD announced
its intention to amend its regulations
concerning PCE dry cleaning so as to
achieve a 95% reduction in PCE emis-
sions by 2010.Most industrial and
environmental observers, accustomed to
EPA’s bias for end-of-pipe regulation,
expected AQMD’s rule amendments to
simply tighten the existing pollution
control requirements applicable to PCE
dry cleaners.Much to their surprise, in
August 2001,AQMD staff instead
proposed to phase out PCE use alto-
gether and force dry cleaners to shift to
non-toxic alternative processes.After a
contentious rulemaking process and
some significant changes, the proposal
and its ban on PCE was finalized in
December 2002.
Like EPA and other regulators,
AQMD is reluctant to intercede in the
production processes and business deci-
sions of regulated entities.So why did
AQMD’s rulemaking staff propose a
phase-out of PCE,and why did the
AQMD Governing Board approve it?
While we cannot completely answer
these questions in this brief article,we
can identify one substantial factor that
propelled this pollution prevention
initiative forward: the unique proactive
nature of AQMD’s Science and Technol-
ogy Advancement Office (“TAO”).TAO
was formed by AQMD in 1988 in
response to an ominous situation:air
quality in the Los Angeles air basin was
so bad that new emission reduction
technologies were needed to attain
applicable standards.The office is charged
with assisting in the development and
demonstration of new technologies.
Initially,TAO focused on spawning and
demonstrating new technologies that
reduced emissions of smog-forming
compounds.More recently,TAO has
expanded its efforts to include toxic-
reducing technologies.
In the case of the PCE dry cleaning
phase-out,TAO played a significant role
in supporting studies of the viability and
commercialization of the leading non-
polluting alternative technology:wet
cleaning.Wet cleaning systems use water
rather than PCE as a cleaning solvent,
relying on specialized detergents,
computer controlled washers, and other
technological advancements to attain
performance comparable to that of PCE
dry cleaning.Although wet cleaning was
available in the early 1990’s,dry cleaners
have been slow to adopt this technology.
Beginning in 1995,TAO assisted in the
funding of (1) rigorous evaluations of the
technical, economic and environmental
performance of wet cleaning, (2) a
number of professional wet cleaning
demonstration facilities in California, and
(3) a technical assistance project designed
to educate cleaners in the South Coast
region about professional wet cleaning.
These efforts provided the necessary
impetus and technical support for
AQMD’s rule development staff to seek
a phase out of PCE in this industry.
Moreover, these projects helped to create
the “social infrastructure”needed to
support the diffusion of new technology:
skilled personnel to provide technical
training;experienced installers,operators
and repair technicians;knowledgeable
vendors such as distributors; and cooper-
ative relationships among all of those
parties.Also,TAO’s work in this area
appears to have assisted the AQMD
governing board in overcoming reserva-
tions they had regarding the commercial
viability of wet cleaning.
By linking TAO with the rule devel-
opment staff,AQMD coordinated
research and demonstration of clean
technologies with the planning,develop-
ment and implementation of prospective
rules.The integration of the technology
advancement function with rule plan-
ning and development provides
regulators with a broader and more
sophisticated understanding of innova-
tive production and technology options
to consider when crafting major rules.
Many state and federal agencies sponsor
research and demonstrations of clean
technologies.For example, the California
Air Resources Board’s Innovative Clean
Air Technologies office (ICAT) has
funded projects to demonstrate the
commercial utility of technical innova-
tions that will improve emission
prevention and control.Yet that office
generally funds technologies relating to
existing regulatory requirements; those
efforts did not support the development
of new rules. In contrast,TAO used its
continued on page 18
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Understanding the E.U. Regulatory Process
By C. Boyden Gray1
As Thomas Friedman has recentlywritten, there is growing diver-gence of interests between
Europe and the United States, a diver-
gence which predates and surpasses
differences over Iraq and which jeop-
ardizes the shared values of the
Atlantic Alliance.This diver-
gence includes differences over
regulatory policy and adminis-
trative law,which, though not
the predominant source, are
nevertheless a significant and
growing cause of friction and
at the same time an opportu-
nity for constructive
reengagement.The ABA’s
Administrative Law Section project to
compare regulatory and administrative
procedures is thus a very timely effort
that can contribute to a better under-
standing between the two continents.
There are several key regulatory differ-
ences which need to be better
understood.For example:
 Transparency.At the very outset there is
a lack of comparable transparency
between the two systems — especially in
view of the fact that even some Euro-
peans do not understand how law gets
translated in Europe into regulatory
requirements that bind the regulated
community.
 Consistency. Procedures can vary
according to economic sector,making it
difficult to understand patterns that
might in fact be common to various
programs (such as the problem
of “agency capture” that is well
understood in the literature
here) and that would make
law practice in Brussels more
predictable and transparent.
 Predominance of Design 0ver
Performance standards.The
European preference for what
would in the United States be
considered outmoded “design” standards
significantly reduces efficiency and
competitiveness, in part because it tends
to benefit incumbents at the expense of
innovators by raising barriers to entry.
 Delegation.The design standard prefer-
ence stems in part from the practice of
delegating the development of suggested
standards to the leading incumbent firms,
whose product then becomes in many
cases the de facto official standard — a
process that would not be tolerated in
the United States.
 Rejection of Cost-benefit Analysis.The
European model makes much less use of
cost-benefit principles than the United
States,which can have the effect of
aggravating the competitiveness prob-
lems of favoring design standards and
reducing economic growth. It also
increases the discretion of agency officials
and thus again reduces the predictability
and transparency of the process.
 Risk vs.Precaution.The Europeans are
less disciplined about managing risk
according to accepted principles,prefer-
ring generally to rely more on discretion,
again reducing both predictability and
transparency.
 Judicial Review.Although this is chang-
ing, the European model generally avoids
judicial review,which presents obvious
accountability and transparency problems
(and differences between the United
States and Europe).
All of these differences contribute,
among other things, to reduced
economic growth and reduced produc-
tivity growth in Europe relative to the
United States,which in turn exacerbates
the friction. It also jeopardizes the U.S.
model,because Europe is having success
exporting its model overseas,especially in
the developing world — making it more
likely that standards developed pursuant
to their process become the standards for
the world market.
1 Partner,Wilmer Cutler & Pickering; and Past
Section Chair.
IS YOUR
LIBRARY
COMPLETE?
Check the list of Section
publications at the back of
this issue to be sure.
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The Section of AdministrativeLaw and Regulatory Practice hasrecently turned its attention to
questions about how principles of
administrative law are, and should be,
applied by the entities that administer
interstate compacts.Among the
projected fruits of this endeavor are the
publication of a book about these
compacts, as well as the development of
a model administrative procedure act for
interstate commissions.To kick off the
project, the Section presented a program
on interstate compacts at its Fall 2003
Administrative Law Conference.What
follows is a slightly revised version of
one set of remarks from that event.
Interstate compacts themselves,of
course, are not new. They go back further
than the United States Constitution does.
Consider, for example,Virginia v.
Maryland, a boundary dispute that the
Supreme Court has just decided. The
issue was whether Fairfax County,
Virginia,could build a facility to draw
drinking water from the Potomac River
without obtaining permission from envi-
ronmental regulators in Maryland. The
case turned in part on interpretation of a
compact between the two states that was
negotiated in 1785 at George Washing-
ton’s home in Mount Vernon. George
Mason represented Virginia, and Samuel
Chase, the future Supreme Court Justice,
represented Maryland. This agreement,
which is older than the Republic, is still
in force today.
Just as the use of interstate compacts
dates back to the founding of the
country, the study of them dates back to
the earliest days of administrative law.Two
of the major figures in the first generation
of scholars of our subject,Felix Frank-
furter and James Landis,wrote a classic
article on interstate compacts in 1925,
which is still frequently cited today. In
short,our Section may be coming a bit
late to the party.Nevertheless,we are now
in a good position to carry forward this
illustrious heritage and apply it to
modern problems.
The genesis of our project was a set of
comments that the Section submitted last
February to the Interstate Commission
for Adult Offender Supervision.The AOS
Compact is essentially an interstate agree-
ment that benefits individuals who have
committed a criminal offense and been
released to the community under the
supervision of state officials, such as parole
or probation officers.The Compact
allows these individuals to relocate to
another state and be supervised by offi-
cials of the second state.The Compact
also contains a mandate for rulemaking
by the commission that administers it. In
addition, it says that the rules shall be
issued through procedures that substan-
tially conform to the federal
Administrative Procedure Act and the
federal Advisory Committee Act.Our
Section submitted a letter,drafted prima-
rily by Professor Michael Asimow,
commenting on how to fulfill these
mandates,particularly on APA issues.
Our letter said that, if the Commission
intended to “substantially conform” to
APA rulemaking procedure, it would
need to construct a process that would
reflect four basic steps derived from the
APA.Those steps are familiar to most
Section members. In any given rulemak-
ing, the Commission would need to
(1) publish the text of proposed rules, for
example in the Federal Register;
(2) accept and consider comments on the
proposal; (3) publish a statement of
reasons to accompany the final rules that
are adopted;and (4) delay the effective
date of the rules by at least thirty days
after they are promulgated.
Those are the APA procedures for
substantive rules that have the force of
law.Our letter went on to recommend
procedures for other types of rules,
including interpretive rules and policy
statements,procedural rules, and emer-
gency rules.
Just days before the Section’s confer-
ence, the Commission that administers
the AOS Compact adopted a set of rule-
making procedures,which had been
drafted by its Rules Committee.The
procedures are available on the Commis-
sion’s website (www.adultcompact.org).
Those procedures concerned only
substantive rulemaking; the additional
kinds of rules that have just been
mentioned have not yet been addressed.
But, for substantive rules that have the
force of law, the Section’s program in
November provided an opportunity to
assess the committee’s performance.
The obvious starting point for that
assessment is the four steps listed above.
The Commission’s compliance with the
first two is readily apparent.The
Commission does publish proposed rules
on its website.That procedure is not
precisely what the federal APA prescribes,
but it does make proposals accessible to
everybody, so it can easily be seen as
“substantially conforming” to the APA.
Moreover, the Commission does accept
comments from interested persons. In the
case of the third and fourth steps,
however, there is somewhat more room
for analysis and rumination.Let us
consider them in reverse order.
What the federal APA provides in its
“fourth step,”once certain exemptions
are taken into account, is that any
Interstate Compacts and 
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1 Henry Hitchcock Professor of Law,Washing-
ton University in St. Louis; 2000–01 Section
Chair. continued on next page
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significant, coercive,non-emergency rule
should not go into effect until people
have had at least thirty days to gear up to
comply.To allow this much preparation
time is the decent thing to do,and the
Commission at least showed its sensitiv-
ity to the issue. In its latest round of
rulemaking, it went beyond the APA
minimum by specifying that the particu-
lar rules will go into effect 120 days after
their adoption.What the Commission
did not do,however,was to state in its
rulemaking procedure that future rules
should also have a delayed effective date
under the circumstances contemplated
by the APA.The Commission probably
should amend its procedures to make
this point explicit, so that drafters of
future rules won’t forget in a particular
instance.
The Commission’s response to the
“third step” raises the most intriguing
questions.The Commission did not
undertake to publish a statement of
reasons along with the final rules. (It did
say that the Rules Committee will
publish explanations for the proposed
rules it puts before the Commission —
but, in fact, its descriptions in this partic-
ular rulemaking were fairly scanty.) With
the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to see
why the committee might have been
reluctant to take our advice.By the terms
of the Compact,each of the forty-two
signatory states is entitled to a representa-
tive on the Commission. In fact, a state
can have more than one commissioner,
and there can also be ex officio nonvot-
ing members.Thus, although the exact
number of members may vary a bit over
time, the Commission is bound to be a
fairly large entity.
Accordingly, the protocol that the
Rules Committee has adopted to govern
the Commission’s deliberations on a rule
is basically parliamentary procedure. It
reads like Robert’s Rules of Order.The
committee introduces a resolution,and
there are motions, amendments,debate,
and votes.But,not too surprisingly, the
protocol does not provide for issuance of
a statement of reasons.An administrative
agency headed by a single Cabinet
Secretary,or even three to five commis-
sioners, can normally formulate an
intelligible rationale for its formal
actions,but it is not so easy for a parlia-
mentary body to agree on such a
statement. In short, the problem for the
Compact Commission is that it’s not
very “compact”!
The lack of a statement of reasons may
cause problems down the road,however.
The reason is that the Compact goes on
to provide that a rule issued through this
procedure is reviewable in federal district
court,either in the District of Columbia
or in the district in which the Commis-
sion’s headquarters is located (Kentucky);
and the rule shall be set aside if not
supported by “substantial evidence in the
rulemaking record.” In this regard, the
Commission’s rules are not like the
actions of most parliamentary bodies.
Now,one can’t be sure how a district
court in Kentucky would proceed in
this area.The likely reactions of a district
court in the District of Columbia are
more predictable,however,because the
D.C.Circuit has written a quite illumi-
nating opinion about judicial review of
another interstate commission.Old Town
Trolley Tours v.Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Commission, 129 F.3d 201
(D.C.Cir.1997). In that case, the transit
commission granted a bus company a
license to give guided tours of the
capital, and a competing trolley
company challenged the license,
although unsuccessfully.
One lesson that emerges from a
reading of the case is that the AOS
Compact judicial review language is
awkwardly drafted.The “substantial
evidence” test is normally used only
where an agency is obliged to make
findings on the record of a formal
evidentiary hearing.An evidentiary
hearing record is very different from a
rulemaking record,which can be a very
unruly collection of papers, letters, arti-
cles, and the like.Fortunately,however,
the D.C.Circuit has a lot of experience
dealing with badly written scope of
review provisions like this, such as the
similarly written OSHA provision. Indus-
trial Union Dep’t,AFL-CIO v.Hodgson,
499 F.2d 467 (D.C.Cir.1974).
The court understands that what the
drafters were trying to say is that they
wanted careful,probing review,not
perfunctory review — an objective that
can be honored within the framework of
ordinary APA review.It is only slightly
facetious to say that the court would
probably read the reference to “substan-
tial evidence” in the AOS Compact to
mean “all the familiar APA review stan-
dards except substantial evidence”! See
Ass’n of Data Processing Serv.Orgs. v.Board
of Govs.,745 F.2d 677 (D.C.Cir.1984)
(arbitrariness test and substantial
evidence test are equally rigorous);Old
Town Trolleys, supra, at 204 (APA review
standards can be read in).To use the stan-
dard catchphrases, this would entail
asking whether a rule is procedurally
defective,ultra vires,or arbitrary.
But here is the more practical point:To
conduct that sort of review,a court
applying APA standards normally expects
to have an explanation of the agency’s
reasoning.Not only must the bottom-
line result be reasonable,but the agency’s
action must also be reasoned.For
example, in the Trolleys case, the court, in
upholding the transit commission, said
that the agency had considered the rele-
vant factors “very carefully and at
length”and that “the explanation it
provided for its action had evidentiary
support.”
So, if the AOS Commission can’t
furnish an acceptable explanation for a
given rule,explaining why it has not
accepted various criticisms or proposed
changes, it could be headed for serious
trouble on judicial review,at least in the
D.C.Circuit.And the choice of venue
may not be critical,because the Sixth
Circuit has also published “hard look”
opinions that are quite probing.See, e.g.,
Cincinnati Bell Tel.Co.v.FCC,69 F.3d
752 (6th Cir.1995).
The Commission contemplates that,
in the event of a court challenge to one
of its rules, it will provide the court with
a tape or transcript of the meeting at
which it adopted the rule.Would that be
good enough? Perhaps.After all, the AOS
Compact merely calls for “substantial
conformity” to the APA.And the courts
may well wish to allow a good deal of
latitude to the Commission, recognizing
that an interstate entity composed of
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dozens of members can scarcely be
equated with a federal administrative
agency.
One suspects,however, that the
Commission’s alternative may not prove
palatable in all circumstances.The nature
of the issues raised by the private party
may become important.Where the tran-
script indicates that the Rules
Committee’s analysis met with general
approval,or that an amendment was
added on the floor of the Commission
with a clear explanation by its sponsor
and no disagreement from other
commissioners, the court might decide
that the transcript contains sufficient
elucidation of the Commission’s thinking
about the points at issue.On the other
hand,a court might reach a different
conclusion in a case in which a rule was
controversial,with various commissioners
articulating diverse reasons for supporting
the measure and others voicing doubts
(not to mention those who perhaps voted
for reasons that the transcript does not
illuminate at all).One thinks, in this
connection,of the familiar problems of
trying to construe a statute by relying on
floor debates as reported in the Congres-
sional Record.
Suppose, then, that the transcript
approach does not work out.How is the
AOS Commission supposed to reconcile
the imperatives of judicial review with
the parliamentary structure through
which it operates? Here is one possible
solution:The Commission’s Rules
Committee (which has a mere ten
members) could write relatively full
explanations of its proposed rules when it
brings them to the Commission,and
then update those explanations in light of
any amendments the Commission
adopts.The updated statement could be
circulated to the Commission or its lead-
ership to secure formal approval.There
may also be other workable solutions, and
these remarks should not be too prescrip-
tive.But this is clearly an area that the
Commission may need to revisit sooner
or later.Likewise, it is one subject to
which our Section should pay attention,
as its quite promising project begins to
take shape.
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In the last week of January 2001, Iwas reviewing newly submittedUtah legislative measures, looking
for proposed regulatory policy and
rulemaking provisions that would
impact the state’s agencies.One
morning, I opened up a bill to create a
new Interstate Compact for Adult
Offender Supervision. It contained
language which delegated rulemaking
functions but was worded differently
than any compacts I had seen before.
Where most interstate compacts
impliedly authorized adoption of rules
to implement substantive functions, this
new Adult Offender Compact expressly
mandated the adoption of such rules -
according to procedures that “substan-
tially conform to principles of the
federal Administrative Procedure Act.”
The prescription that some state-to-
state rulemaking actions should conform
to the federal APA caught my attention. I
wondered if states could conduct inter-
state-agreement functions under the
federal APA.Could the federal APA’s
authority over federal rulemaking
actions be applied to state rulemaking
actions? And further, since publication of
rules is required but no reference was
made to any particular media, I
wondered if the Adult Offender
Compact agency would be required to
publish rules in the federal register,or
would some other publication be
acceptable - such as the internet?
Looking for Answers
The sponsoring agency quickly referred
me to Rick Masters,outside counsel for
the Council of State Governments and
legal counsel for the drafting team.Rick
answered some questions and sent some
materials.He pointed out that interstate
compacts are agreements between states
that commit time and resources to
manage joint functions or resolve prob-
lems shared by states and that if a state
adopts a compact, that instrument
becomes a binding contract upon future
state legislatures.2
I later learned that the rulemaking
language for the Adult Offender
Compact had been lifted from a
compact that had only been adopted by
one state and would likely lapse.When I
asked Rick Masters why reference was
made to the federal APA rather than a
state APA,he said that no one state had
the “best”APA and that a single state’s
APA would not be acceptable to other
states. I asked if the drafters had obtained
any input about federal APA theory and
practice from an administrative-law prac-
titioner or scholar. I then asked if his
group had considered using a separate
compact as an APA for all compacts.
Rick paused,and answered:“Why didn’t
I think of that?”That was a defining
moment, and I realized for the first-time
that I had stumbled onto a difficult
policy issue.
Rick then asked me a question:Would
I join their next compact drafting team to
re-write the Interstate Compact on Juve-
nile Offenders with about 25 persons
from state and federal offices.Upon
joining that group,we looked at the
federal APA and the 1981 Model State
Administrative Procedure Act.We finally
agreed on language that has the Juvenile
Offender Compact rules conforming
with principles of the 1981 MSAPA,“or
any other Administrative Procedure Act
as selected by the Commission.”As of this
date, some states have now adopted the
Juvenile Offender Compact,and it is
being introduced in others.
Breaking with the Past
In 2002,another group drafted a new
Compact on Insurance Product Regula-
tion and took the same rulemaking
approach our Juvenile Offender Compact
used.So now,there are four interstate
compacts,with one having already been
adopted,that mandate adoption of rule-
making procedures.To my way of
thinking,this signals an important change
in compact law.A whole new body of
administrative rulemaking is emerging,
and while these four compacts may lack
some of the structure and process typical
of most state’s notice and comment
methods,this is a new direction for inter-
state compact rulemaking.
In the past, for the most part, rules
and/or policies issued under most inter-
state compacts normally were not the
product of administrative law methodol-
ogy. I looked at several older compacts
and noted three fairly typical rulemaking
patterns:
(a) Most early compacts empowered
their commissions to administer their
substantive functions,but rulemaking
and or other similar regulatory processes
were not prescribed by those compacts.
Examples include the Interstate
Compact on Corrections and the Inter-
state Compact on Civil Defense.
(b) Later compacts, into the late
1950’s, rarely mentioned rules.They only
required a compact’s policies to comply
with each adopting state’s statutes, rules,
or regulations pertinent to their imple-
Interstate Compacts:The Next Frontier 
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1 Legal/Policy consultant with the Utah
Governor’s Office of Planning & Budget;Vice
Chair, State Administrative Law Committee;
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2 The states have devised about 195 Interstate
Compacts since 1783.And although the U.S.
Constitution provides that “No State shall,
without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into
any Agreement or Compact with another
State,” the U.S. Supreme Court has held that
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compact increases political power in the States
in a manner that encroaches upon or interferes
with the supremacy of federal law.Cuyler v.
Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 101 S.Ct. 703, 707-08
(1981).
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mentation.The Interstate Compact on
Wildlife Violators is an example.
(c) Recent compacts, through the
1980’s, tended to provide for administra-
tive regulations,but without specifying
rulemaking procedures.Examples include
the Interstate Compact on Vehicle Equip-
ment Safety and the Commission for
Higher Education.
When courts upheld rules under these
prior interstate compacts, they found
implied rulemaking authority to carry
out the substantive functions enumerated
by each particular compact - essentially
the “contract law”approach.The new
Adult Offender Compact diverts from
that mode and specifically requires that its
Commissioners make rules to implement
the act.
Why have drafters of four new inter-
state compacts turned to express
rulemaking authority? One major reason
stands out: lack of enforcement authority.
During our first Juvenile Offender
Compact drafting meeting,delegates
simply could not express enough of their
complete and utter dissatisfaction with
how the current Juvenile Offender
Compact is failing the states.Basically, it is
not being upheld by some states who feel
they can choose when NOT to comply.
This enforcement-authority question
was the major reason for changing the
old Adult Probationer/Parolee Compact.
In the mid-1980’s,when the former
Interstate Compact for Supervision of
Parolees and Probationers was first being
considered for revision,having been
adopted in 1937, there was much discus-
sion of a problem that had surfaced over
the years.When one state refused to
cooperate, the Probationer/Parolee
Compact offered the “state-having-juris-
diction” little or no relief.Frustrated, the
National Institute of Corrections in 1986
funded a Commission to Re-Structure
the Probationer/Parolee Compact, and
in their study, they identified eight major
enforcement gaps, six of which could be
addressed through the provision of
express rulemaking authority:
1.Outdated client eligibility require-
ments,which preclude acceptance of
certain client groups...(i.e.,misde-
meanants);
2. Inefficient, inflexible and cumber-
some operational procedures, resulting in
delays in transfers, arrests, and program
delivery;
3.A lack of authority in some states to
arrest out-of-state violators;
4.An inefficient interstate parole and
probation violation process;
5.A lack of uniformity in administra-
tion of preliminary revocation hearings;
and
6.Conflicting state policies in the areas
of misdemeanant supervision,administra-
tion of supervision fees and supervision of
certain difficult client groups (for
example,clients with diseases like AIDS).
A Question of Force of Law
I suggest that the Adult Offender
Compact drafters have turned to federal
APA notice and comment rulemaking
because of two basic reasons: (a) requiring
notice & comment and publication in a
document like the federal register will
garner more deference by courts; and (b)
requiring that the promulgation of rules
substantially conform to an Administra-
tive Procedure Act will help impart the
force of law.
It is the concept that a compact rule
needs to have the force of law that is of
interest here.Let me focus on that for a
moment.When I informed my office’s
legal counsel that the Adult Offender
Compact was seeking an increased force
of law,he noted that if administrative rule-
making was adopted by states for
implementing compacts, then other states
might possibly gain enforcement powers
against our own state.He wasn’t sure he
liked the idea of another state being able
to bring stronger enforcement action
against our state.But let me suggest that
his issue cuts both ways. If a state doesn’t
want to enforce certain mutually-agreed-
upon solutions to common problems,
then I would argue that state should not
join a compact in the first place. If one
state finds that another state has the
authority to take them to court over an
issue of non-compliance,and wants to
avoid the consequence of that policy, then
that state should take steps to withdraw
from that compact.
Seeking Uniformity
In wrestling with these questions, I noted
that while APA-type rulemaking may be
an option for newly enacted compacts,
there are another 190 plus interstate
compacts currently in force that do not
mandate administrative rulemaking
methods.How can an APA rulemaking
option be provided to agencies operating
under those compacts? At some point in
my discussion with Rick Masters, I
concluded that a new APA could be
drafted using the best features of the
federal APA, the 1981-MSAPA and exist-
ing state APAs. It could also take
advantage of much of the rulemaking
scholarship from over the past 25 years.
If such a new APA were prepared for
interstate compacts, I see two options:
Option-1 - It could be adopted by the
states as a separate interstate compact on
administrative procedure covering all
compacts that any one state has entered
into.Such a compact APA would be a
controlling act,would delegate rulemak-
ing authority,would define time-frames
and filing calendars, and provide notice
and comment procedures similar to APAs
already adopted by the 50 states.But the
downside is clear.A state would need to
adopt this new APA compact through
legislation.What happens if one or more
states fail to adopt? Would Congress have
to consent to such an APA compact?
Option-2 - The new draft APA
language could become a “rule on rules.”
This approach would allow each of the
existing 190+ compact commissions to
adopt the language as a rule or by-law.But
there is a downside here as well.At least in
some states,a legal “cloud”might exist.
Courts might hold that because an APA
rulemaking method was not included in
the wording of these older compacts,and
didn’t even exist as an option at all prior to
1946,many compact agencies may not
have the option of adopting APA-type
procedures without passing an amend-
ment to the compacts themselves.
Conclusion
It is not clear to this author that whole-
sale adoption of the federal APA is well
suited to serving the needs of an interstate
compact agency.Likewise,exclusive
application of the 1981 State Model APA
may be equally unsuitable.Drafting some
other APA holds promise but is not risk
continued on page 18
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The Case for an Interstate Compact APA
By William S. Morrow, Jr.1
Interstate compacts are an effectivetool for structuring interstate rela-tionships, regulating private activity
that transcends state lines and furnishing
government services on a regional basis.
They offer an alternative to federal
programs and regulation and are partic-
ularly apt for matters traditionally
addressed by states, such as law enforce-
ment and public health, safety and
welfare. Some 190 interstate agreements
are currently in place.
Interstate compacts may be divided
into two categories, those that have been
approved by Congress pursuant to
Article I, section 10,clause 3 of the U.S.
Constitution,often referred to as the
Compact Clause, and those that have
not.Those that are approved by Congress
become federal law.Cuyler v.Adams,449
U.S.433,101 S.Ct.703,707–08 (1981).
Those that are not are nevertheless
contracts binding on the signatories, such
that no single State may unilaterally alter
the bargain.West Virginia ex rel.Dyer v.
Sims,341 U.S.22,28 (1951).
When interstate compact agencies
prescribe regulations, adjudicate disputes,
respond to requests for information or
hold meetings,whose Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) applies? Many
compacts are approved by Congress.
Does that mean those agencies are
governed by the federal APA? Having
been created by agreements between
states,does that mean state APAs apply? If
so,which one or ones? Do both federal
and state APAs apply? If so,what happens
if there is a conflict? Do normal preemp-
tion rules apply? Or could it be that
neither the federal nor the state APAs
apply?
This article takes a brief look at the
intersection of APA and interstate
compact precedent and concludes that in
many,probably most, cases neither the
federal nor the state APAs apply.The
solution proposed is the creation of an
Interstate Compact APA.
I. Which, if any, APA Applies?
Are compact agencies approved by
Congress federal agencies within the
meaning of the federal APA? Are
compact agencies covered by the signa-
tories’APAs? The answer to each
question begins,but does not end,with a
look at how APAs define the term
“agency.”
A. State APA
State APAs typically define the term
“agency”broadly enough to encompass
an interstate compact agency.For
example,Virginia’s Administrative
Process Act defines agency to mean:“any
authority, instrumentality,officer,board
or other unit of the state government
empowered by the basic laws to make
regulations or decide cases.”Va.Code
Ann.§ 2.2–4001 (2003).The definition
of agency in South Dakota’s Administra-
tive Procedures Act includes “agent[s] of
the state vested with the authority to
exercise any portion of the state’s sover-
eignty.”S.D.Codified Laws § 1–26–1(1)
(2003) (emphasis added). It is not
uncommon for a compact or court to
characterize an interstate agency as an
agency or instrumentality of the signa-
tory States.
Some compacts require that the
agency follow the APA of the State with
the most restrictive provisions.For
example, article III(d) of the Tahoe
Regional Planning Compact,Pub.L.
No.96–551,94 Stat.3233,3237 (1980),
provides that “all meetings shall be open
to the public to the same extent required
by the law of the State of California or
the State of Nevada,whichever imposes
the greater requirements, applicable to
local governments at the time such
meeting is held.”
Some State APAs,however,expressly
exclude interstate compact agencies from
their purview.Delaware’s APA provides
that the term agency “does not include
… joint state-federal, interstate or inter-
municipal authorities and their
agencies.”DEL.CODE ANN.TIT.29
§ 10102(1) (2003).New York’s APA
provides that the term agency “shall not
include . . . agencies created by interstate
compact.”N.Y.A.P.A.LAW § 102.1.
(Consol.2003).The District of Colum-
bia’s APA has been held not to apply to
interstate agencies.KiSKA Construction
Corporation–U.S.A.v.Washington Metro
Area Transit Authority,167 F.3d 608 (D.C.
Cir.1999) (citing Latimer v. Joint Commit-
tee on Landmarks of the National Capital,
345 A.2d 484,487 (D.C.1975)).
And compact precedent barring the
application of a single signatory’s laws in
a manner that conflicts with or is incon-
sistent with the terms of the States’
agreement tends to render all State APAs
inoperative with respect to interstate
compact agencies. Illustrative of this line
of cases is the District Court decision in
C.T.Hellmuth & Assocs., Inc., v.Washington
Metro Area Transit Authority,414 F.Supp.
408 (D.Md.1976),holding that the
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority (WMATA) is not subject to
the Maryland Public Information Act,
Art.76A MD.ANN.CODE (1975 Repl.
Vol.),because the signatories’ freedom of
information laws “differ in not insignifi-
cant respects,”and no single signatory is
free to “impose its preferences . . . in
derogation of the compact,”no matter
how minimal the imposition may be.
414 F.Supp.at 409–10. It should come as
no surprise that there is great variation
among the various State APAs, such that
no two are exactly alike.Compact prece-
dent thus leaves little room,and in most
instances no room, for finding compact
agencies subject to these statutes.
1 General Counsel,Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Commission;Vice Chair, State
Administrative Law Committee.
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B. Federal APA
The federal APA defines agency in perti-
nent part as:
each authority of the Government of the
United States,whether or not it is within
or subject to review by another agency,but
does not include—
(A) the Congress;
(B) the courts of the United States;
(C) the governments of the territories
or possessions of the United States;
(D) the government of the District of
Columbia.
5 U.S.C.§ 551(1).
When consenting to an interstate
compact tending to “encroach upon or
interfere with the just supremacy of the
United States,”no doubt Congress could
qualify its consent by declaring the result-
ing administrative body to be an
“authority of the Government of the
United States.”But what would be the
point? If creating a federal agency is the
appropriate solution, it would be simpler
and more direct to have Congress simply
pass a federal statute containing the terms
of what would have been the States’
agreement and avoid unnecessary negoti-
ations and complications.The value in
interstate compacts derives from the
States working out their own problems
free of federal oversight.Recognizing this
basic fact best preserves State sovereignty.
Congress understood this when it
consented to the creation of the Pacific
Northwest Electric Power and Conserva-
tion Planning Council,declaring that the
Council “shall not be considered an
agency or instrumentality of the United
States for the purpose of any Federal law.”
16 U.S.C.§ 839b(a)(2)(A).2 Similarly,
when Congress has ventured beyond
merely granting consent to becoming a
full compact participant, it has taken pains
to disavow the resulting entity as an
agency of the federal government.When
the United States became a signatory to
the Delaware River Basin Compact,
section 15.1(m) was added to provide that
the Delaware River Basin Commission
“‘shall not be considered a Federal
agency’ for purposes of the federal APA.
The United States’participation as a
signatory to the Susquehanna River
Basin Compact,was conditioned on the
same understanding.Pub.L.No.91–575,
§ 2(l),84 Stat.1509(Dec.24,1970).
The courts,however,have been quite
willing to inquire as to whether a particu-
lar compact agency is so endowed with a
federal interest that it should be consid-
ered a “quasi-federal agency.”See e.g.,
Elcon Enterprises, Inc. v.Washington Metro
Area Transit Authority,977 F.2d 1472 (D.C.
Cir.1992) (noting intra-circuit split and
assuming without deciding that WMATA
is a quasi-federal agency).On the other
hand,although Congressional approval of
an interstate compact can be a factor in
determining quasi-federal agency status, it
should not be regarded as dispositive.The
courts generally have held that there must
be some other federal-interest factors
present such as a federal role in appoint-
ing agency members, federal funding or
furtherance of federal objective;other-
wise, federal status will be denied.And
sometimes even the presence of one of
these federal-nexus factors is not enough.
Finding that a compact agency
approved by Congress is not a federal
agency can create an administrative law
gap in need of filling.Some courts fill that
gap with the federal APA notwithstand-
ing a finding that the agency is not strictly
speaking an authority of the United
States government. In Old Town Trolley
Tours v.Washington Metro Area Transit
Commission,129 F.3d 201,204 (D.C.Cir.
1997), the DC Circuit did just that when
faced with deciding the appropriate stan-
dard for reviewing licensing decisions of
the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Commission under the recently amended
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Regulation Compact,which provided for
judicial review of Commission orders in
the DC Circuit but was silent on the
scope of review.The court adopted by
reference the standards in 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A)–(D) because the court had
followed those standards under the pre-
amended Compact and because such
standards are commonplace and merely
restated the law as to the scope of judicial
review when enacted in 1946.But some
courts simply find the federal APA does
not apply.Asking the courts to fill in the
gaps introduces risk and uncertainty in
compact administration.
II. Proposed Solution
The Section of Administrative Law &
Regulatory Practice of the American Bar
Association (ABA) has embarked on a
project to draft an APA for application to
or adoption by agencies created by inter-
state compacts.The immediate goal is to
have the project’s work product adopted
by the House of Delegates as ABA policy.
Ultimately,existing compact agencies and
future compact signatories could adopt
some or all of the resulting guidelines.
Some might question why the model
State APA could not be adopted by
compact agencies and their signatories
instead.This might be problematic for
existing compact agencies.States typically
do not adopt model legislation without
deleting some provisions and modifying
and adding others.A court may be reluc-
tant to uphold an agency’s adoption of a
specific model provision rejected by one
of the signatories.Further, the model act
was promulgated in 1981.The state of
administrative law has changed greatly
since then,and while a proposal has been
submitted to the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
to conduct a study of subsequent devel-
opments with an eye toward revision,
action is not guaranteed any time soon.
Finally, the model State APA does not
accommodate the structure of compacts
or reflect the unique status and experi-
ence of compact agencies and pertinent
compact precedent.The Interstate
Compact APA Project will take these
factors into consideration.
Adopting the federal APA presents its
own problems,even though some
compacts take this approach with respect
to rulemaking.First, adopting the federal
APA may be politically unattractive given
that one of the reasons compacts are
selected as the vehicle for resolving
disputes between states and implement-
ing state policies and programs on an
interstate level is to avoid or at least mini-
mize federal involvement.Second, if the
agency is expressly not a federal agency
and/or is held not to be a quasi-federal-
2 Only if the affected States failed to create the
Council and appoint its members in a timely
fashion would the Secretary of Energy be
empowered to establish the Council as a
federal agency. 16 U.S.C.§ 839b(b). continued on page 18
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From the remarks of
Kathleen Q.Aber-
nathy,Member,Federal
Communications
Commission,at the
annual Awards Lunch
for public service and
for scholarship in the
administrative law
field:
Public service is a
noble calling and in
my experience has drawn some of the
best and brightest to government.Many
who have pursued opportunities in the
public sector share a simple desire to do
right by the American people. ...Collec-
tively,public servants possess a wealth of
knowledge and expertise that forms the
backbone of the administrative state.
[O]ur administrative agencies merge
this apolitical expertise with presiden-
tially- appointed leadership.My job as a
commissioner is to implement the law set
forth in the Communications Act,but,
inevitably,public officials are called upon
to exercise discretion and to fall back on a
guiding regulatory philosophy...A presi-
dent accordingly tends to fill agency posts
with officials who share his or her core
ideological preferences.This helps ensure
that agencies will make decisions not
only based on their embedded knowl-
edge base,but also in a manner that
reflects the public’s choice of executive
leadership.Another benefit of combining
career public servants and political
appointees is that it provides an opportu-
nity to infuse an agency with fresh ideas
and perspectives.
From the plenary address by Orson
Swindle,Member,Federal Trade Commission:
I believe our Founding Fathers had it
right:government should play only a
minimal role in our lives, should not be
intrusive, and should avoid being unrea-
sonably burdensome.Those of us serving
in government should begin each day
mindful of our modern distillation of the
Hippocratic Oath:“Above all,do no
harm.” I add a personal challenge to this
approach before making final decisions by
asking myself and my staff:“Does this
make sense?”
Although I am an advocate for less
government intervention and more
private sector self-regulation, I do not
wish to leave you with the impression
that I believe there is no role for govern-
ment, and especially for the FTC.Quite
to the contrary.First of all,my experience
at the FTC only reinforces my belief that
too often the heavy hand of government
involvement is a direct reaction to the
misdeeds and excesses of those in the
private sector.Profit is a great motive and
driving force in our economic system,
but greed tarnishes us all. In recent years,
we have certainly seen sufficient examples
of greed that begs for some higher
authority to act forcefully.Our experi-
ences at the FTC remind us daily that
there are firms and individuals attempting
to fix prices, lessen competition,and
otherwise illegally manipulate the
marketplace and to engage in unfair,
deceptive, and fraudulent practices - all of
which cause (or can cause) considerable
harm to consumer welfare.
The 2003 Administrative Law Conference
continued from the inside front cover
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[T]he FTC is a very busy agency with
a lot of complex consumer protection
and competition matters on its plate.
Despite our workload,however,we
manage to deal thoroughly with each
case that comes before us.Although a lot
of what we deal with involves technical
questions of law and economics, I believe
that we in government have a duty to
apply a generous dose of common sense
to our law enforcement and regulatory
activities. In my view,an approach that
blends analytical rigor with a common-
sense, realistic appraisal of what role
government should play is the best path
toward our goal at the FTC:to protect
the welfare of consumers.
From the remarks of
Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor at the
“Understanding the
European Union
Regulatory Process”
program unveiling the
Section’s new EU
project:
I don’t pretend to
have expertise in
the area of EU
Administrative law,but I have been
extremely interested in the development
of the European Union. I think that in
the century just ended one of the most
important, if not the most important,
events that occurred in that century was
the formation of the European Union
and the notion that after generation after
generation of wars among nations in the
area now covered by the EU, that a
union would have been formed and that
we would have had peace for over fifty
years in that region,and cooperation on
a level never before seen is truly incredi-
bly.The European Union...today has
more people living within it than we
have in our country and it is a formida-
ble area of the world in terms of its
influence and it’s economic strength and
power.
Now at present I think there is virtu-
ally no transparency in the setting of
European Union policies and regula-
tions.And legislation is basically
developed by the Commission.The
Commission consists of unelected
members and there is no representative-
ness or responsiveness in the sense that
we are accustomed to in this country by
members of the commission who are
setting policy.They are not elected in
public participatory elections and there is
no body to whom they must report.So
it’s very different from the kinds of poli-
cymaking and regulatory setting that we
are accustomed to in this country.
I will be very interested to see your
black letter description of this process. I
think it’s needed because businesses here
have an urgent need to know how to
conduct business there and vice versa,
and I think the more that we can
acquaint people on this side of the
Atlantic and people in the EU with the
differences, and in some cases similarities,
of the administrative law process in these
two regions it will be very helpful.So I
think you are engaged in something “a”
very difficult, and “b”very useful.
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Subcommittee Co-Chair Fred Emery (L)
presents Mary C. Lawton 2003 Outstanding
Government Service Award to Michael F.
Messitte.
Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor
2004 NALJ Foundation Fellowship
The National Administrative Law Judge Foundation, the
public interest arm of the National Association of Adminis-
trative Law Judges, is requesting applications for the 2004
Fellowship.The topic for the 2004 Fellowship is “The Rela-
tionship of the Administrative Law Adjudicator to the
Agency Head.”
The Fellow will prepare an original article for publication
in the Journal of the National Association of Administrative
Law Judges, and will deliver a fifty-minute oral presentation
at the annual meeting in the fall of 2004.The Fellow will
receive a $1,000 cash stipend and travel expenses.The final
draft of the paper will be due December 31,2004.
Applicants should submit two copies of a detailed outline,
abstract or introduction to the paper,with a writing sample,
curriculum vitae, and list of publications,by February 1,
2004. The Fellowship Committee will review the submis-
sions and select a Fellow by March 30,2004. Applications
and inquiries should be addressed to the Chair of the
Fellowship Committee:
Edwin L.Felter, Jr.
Senior Administrative Law Judge 
Colorado Division of Administrative Hearings 
1120 Lincoln Street,Suite 1400 
Denver,Colorado 80203 
Tel: (303) 764-1417 
Fax: (303) 764-1401 
Email: ed.felter@state.co.us 
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Friday, February 6, 2004
10:00 a.m. – Noon
Protection of Industry from Terrorism versus 
Openness of Regulatory and Safety Information: 
The Homeland Security Dilemma
Cost:$25.00 Members;$35.00 Non-Members;FREE for
Students 
“Critical Infrastructure Information” is shielded from Freedom
of Information Act disclosure in order to protect industry and
local government facilities from attack.The new secrecy clashes
with decades of increasing openness and public accountability.
This panel will explore the security related issues and suggest
ways clients and agencies can deal with the new decisions that
must be made.
Panelists:
 Jamie Conrad, American Chemistry Council;
 Daniel J.Metcalfe, Director,Office of Information &
Privacy,US Department of Justice;
 James T.O’Reilly,Professor,University of Cincinnati
College of Law and 
 Wendy Wagner,Professor,University of Texas at Austin
School of Law.
Moderator: Lynne K.Zusman,Lynne K.Zusman and Associ-
ates,P.C.
1:00 p.m. – 3:00 p.m.
The Energy Bill and FERC – Past, Present and Future
Cost:$25.00 Members;$35.00 Non-Members;FREE for
Students 
The year 2003 saw tremendous activity in the energy industry,
including the nation’s largest power blackout in August.With
the passage of the Energy Bill stalled in the Senate at the end of
the year, there are many questions regarding energy policy
developments.Secretary Abraham is confident that Congress
Section of Administrative Law
and Regulatory Practice
2004 Midyear Meeting
Hyatt Regency San Antonio
February 6–8, 2004
For registration information phone (202) 662-1528, or email KnightK@staff.abanet.org
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will pass a comprehensive Energy Bill in January.What form
will the Energy Bill take? How will it affect industry? In what
ways will FERC’s regulatory role change? Join this panel for an
inside look at the past,present and future of the Energy Bill and
FERC’s regulatory responsibilities, from both an industry view-
point and the regulator’s perspective.
Panelists:
 Shelton Cannon,Deputy Director of the Office of Market
Tariffs and Rates,Federal Energy Regulatory Commission;
 Bruce Edelston,Director,Policy and Planning,Southern
Company;
 Diana M.Liebmann,Associate,Haynes and Boone,LLP;and 
 Michael J.Zimmer,Partner,Baker & McKenzie.
Moderator:Kenneth G.Hurwitz, Partner,Haynes and Boone,
LLP,Washington,DC.
3:30 p.m. – 5:30 p.m.
“Lessons from Do-not-Call”
Cost:$25.00 Members;$35.00 Non-Members;Free for
Students
This program will address some of the most contentious issues
raised by the FTC and FCC’s recent “Do-not-Call”privacy
initiative. Issues raised concern the protection of commercial
speech,differing treatment of not-for-profit and for-profit tele-
marketers, and what lessons could be learned for anti-spam
initiatives.The panel will include a variety of viewpoints from
both the public and private sectors.
Panelists:
 Jodie Bernstein,Former Director,Bureau of Consumer
Protection,Federal Trade Commission and Partner,Bryan
Cave,LLP;
 Eileen Harrington,Associate Director,Division of Market-
ing Practices,Bureau of Consumer Protection,Federal Trade
Commission;and 
 Brad Schuelke, Texas Assistant Attorney General for
Consumer Protection.
Moderator:Steve Vieux,Federal Trade Commission 
6:00 p.m. – 8:00 p.m.
Section Reception – Casa Rio
430 East Commerce Street,San Antonio
Cost:$35.00 Members;$45.00 Non-Members;
$35.00 Guest(s)
Join us for the Administrative Law and Regula-
tory Practice Section Reception at Casa Rio.
Enjoy authentic Mexican and Southwestern cuisine along with
an open bar.Founded in 1946,Casa Rio sits on land first
granted title in 1777 by the King of Spain.The Spanish Colonial
period hacienda became the core of the new business.The cedar
door and window lintels, the fireplace, and thick rock walls, are
still evident inside the building.Casa Rio was the first San
Antonio business to open its doors to the River and take advan-
tage of the River’s setting.Canoes,gondolas, and paddle boats,
evolving into tour and dinner boats,began here and helped
create the Riverwalk of today.
Saturday, February 7, 2004
1:30 p.m. – 3:30 p.m.
The Lawyer–Lobbyist “on the Frontier”: What Legal and
Ethical Rules Apply? 
Cost:$25.00 Members;$35.00 Non-Members;Free for Students
When a lawyer engages in lobbying activity,he or she may find
that the legal and ethical rules (and protections) that normally
apply to his rendition of professional services drop away,only to
be replaced by an entirely different scheme of regulation.While
the Pennsylvania judiciary has recently claimed the exclusive
right to regulate at least some services provided by lawyers that
count as lobbying,other courts are finding that,when a lawyer
engages in lobbying activities,privileges that exist in other
contexts are no longer available to resist discovery and trial testi-
mony. In December 2001, the lawyers that sought the last
minute pardon by President Clinton for fugitive American busi-
nessman Marc Rich discovered this to their dismay.Then in July
2002, the FDIC was able to obtain a subpoena related to the
lobbying activities of one of Washington’s most prominent law
firms on behalf of an individual client.
This program will focus on some of the distinctive issues,both
legal and ethical, that confront the lawyer who is performing what
might be considered “lobbying activities” for his or her client.For
example,to what extent do the ABA’s Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct regulate such conduct? Does the attorney–client
or work product privilege disappear when the lawyer used lobby-
ing activities as part of the strategy to advance the interests of his
or her client? What do existing legal and ethical rules say about
contingency fee lobbying? And,when it comes to the attorney for
the public interest client,what distinctive challenges and issues are
presented by the dual roles of lawyer and lobbyist?
Panelists:
 Thomas D.Morgan, Oppenheim Professor of Anti-Trust
and Trade Regulation Law,George Washington University
Law School;
 Thomas M. Susman,Partner,Ropes & Gray LLP,and 
 David C.Vladeck,Director of Public Citizen Litigation
Group and Adjunct Professor of Law,Georgetown University
Law Center.
Moderator:William V.Luneburg,University of Pittsburgh
School of Law.
6:30 p.m. – 9:30 p.m.
Section Dinner – Boudro’s on the Riverwalk in “The Vault” 
Located at the corners of Commerce and Presa
Streets,San Antonio
Cost:$65.00 Members;$75.00 Non-Members:
$65.00 Guest(s)
Join us for the Administrative Law and Regula-
tory Practice Section reception and dinner at
Boudro’s on the Riverwalk in one their special
private rooms — The Vault — the actual lobby of the historic
Alamo National Bank.The evening begins with cocktails and
appetizers followed by a three-course dinner.
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agency,applying the federal APA really
does not make sense.Third, like the
model State APA, the federal APA was
not enacted with compact agencies in
mind.The project output will be.
III. Conclusion
State APAs only apply to interstate
compact agencies whose governing
compacts expressly authorize such treat-
ment, and few compacts so provide.
Congressional consent transforms a
compact into federal law but does not in
and of itself transform a compact agency
into an authority of the government of
the United States within the meaning of
the federal APA.The result is that courts
are often left looking for administrative
law to apply.That search would be aided
by,and one would hope ultimately
circumvented by, the development of
guidelines that not only embody the
modern administrative law principles
common to most APAs but reflect
compact precedent and the experience
of compact signatories and agencies, as
well,– an interstate compact APA.
Mandating Pollution Prevention
continued from page 5
The Case for an Interstate Compact APA
continued from page 13
Interstate Compacts:The Next Frontier for Administrative Rulemaking
continued from page 11
dry cleaning work not only to assist and
educate the industry,but also to support
and educate the AQMD’s rule develop-
ment staff and governing board.
Undoubtedly, integration of the
technical advancement and rule devel-
opment functions at EPA and other
agencies would entail significant changes
to their existing organizational struc-
tures. In particular, such a model would
require provision of increased financial,
personnel and organizational resources
to the technology advancement func-
tion, and the creation of more formal,
routine channels of communication
between the technology office and other
offices within the relevant agency.
Nonetheless, if policymakers want regu-
lated entities to blend together business
and environmental concerns, they must
be willing to do the same within their
own organizations.
free.To give meaningful consideration to
these options - and to address other defi-
ciencies in compact administrative law in
the areas of adjudication, judicial review,
openness and management - the Section
of Administrative Law and Regulatory
Practice has embarked on a project to
research and draft a model APA for inter-
state compacts.Approximately forty
volunteers in the legal profession - from
academia,government and private prac-
tice - have joined together in an effort to
survey case law on interstate compact
procedure, review the provisions of exist-
ing APAs at the federal and state levels,
and examine current rules and regulatory
policies of compact agencies.The project
is co-chaired by myself and Bill Morrow,
general counsel of the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Commission,
and is expected to take two to three years.
Anyone interested in joining should
contact Bill Morrow at wmatc@erols.
com,or the author at kbishop@
utah.gov.
NEED SOME 
CLE HOURS?
Visit the Section’s Website at www.abanet.org/adminlaw
and click on ONLINE CLE for access to Section
programs at 
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By William Funk1
As this is written, the Supreme Court has decided only ahandful of cases this term,but among them was anadministrative law case applying Chevron.Barnhart v.
Thomas, 124 S.Ct. 376 (2003).Thomas involved a former
elevator operator whose job had been eliminated.Thereafter
she applied for Social Security Disability benefits,which
requires that she be unable to perform substantial gainful activ-
ity by reason of a medical condition. Specifically, the statute
states that the condition be of such severity that she “is not
only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot . . . engage in
any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy. . . .”“Work which exists in the national
economy” is further defined as “work which exists in signifi-
cant numbers”either where the applicant lives or in several
regions of the country.After a hearing before an ALJ, she was
found to suffer hypertension, cardiac arrythmia, and cervical
and lumbar strain/sprain, but the ALJ found that these ailments
did not prevent her from performing her past work as an
elevator operator.Consistent with Social Security regulations,
he refused to consider whether the job of elevator operator still
existed in significant numbers in the national economy.The
Third Circuit en banc held that the statute unambiguously
provides that the ability to perform one’s prior work is disqual-
ifying only if that work exists in the national economy.This
holding conflicted with that reached by four other courts of
appeal, so the Court granted certiorari.
The Third Circuit found the statute unambiguous because,
“by referring first to ‘previous work’and then to ‘any other kind
of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy,’ the statute unambiguously indicates that the former is
a species of the latter.”The Supreme Court disagreed in a unani-
mous opinion by Justice Scalia. In his words, the Third Circuit’s
interpretation was “precisely contrary to the grammatical ‘rule of
the last antecedent,’”and while such a rule is not an absolute and
can be overcome by other indicia of meaning,here there was no
reason not to give effect to the normal grammatical rule. In
response to the argument that it would be absurd to deny a
person disability benefits because they can perform a job that
does not exist in the national economy, the Court posited that it
was plausible that Congress chose the ability to perform one’s
past work as “an effective and efficient administrative proxy for
the claimant’s ability to do some work that does exist in the
national economy.”Such a proxy would often allow the agency
to avoid the more difficult investigation as to whether the person
was unable to perform any other work in the national economy,
thereby saving agency resources.The fact that the proxy might
not always be accurate would hardly make such a rule unreason-
able.“To generalize is to be imprecise.Virtually every legal (or
other) rule has imperfect applications in particular circum-
stances.”The Court concluded:“The proper Chevron inquiry is
not whether the agency construction can give rise to undesir-
able results in some instances . . . ,but rather whether, in light of
the alternatives, the agency construction is reasonable.”
There does not appear to be anything special in this opinion,
but it does once again remind us how deferential the Supreme
Court is at Chevron’s step two.The reasonableness of the agency’s
interpretation,potentially disqualifying even a person disabled
from holding any job existing in the national economy,did not
derive from any proof or administrative record material, thereby
distinguishing this assessment from the reasonableness inquiry
attendant to judicial review of agency action as arbitrary or
capricious. Indeed, there is nothing other than the Court’s
supposition that using a person’s ability to do his or her past
work as a proxy for performing other work in the national
economy would indeed save any agency resources, and there is
nothing other than the Court’s dismissal of the perfection of
rules that assesses the actual consequences of the agency’s rule on
individuals.
—————————————————
The Court has recently granted certiorari in a potentially
important administrative law case.The issue in Norton v.South-
ern Utah Wilderness Alliance (decided below sub nom.Southern
Utah Wilderness Alliance v.Norton,301 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir.2002))
involves judicial review of agency inaction under 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(1),which provides that a court shall “compel agency
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”Although
lower courts have struggled to harmonize the APA’s limitation
of judicial review to “final agency action”with this provision
and a definition of agency action that includes “a failure to act,”
the Supreme Court has apparently never specifically addressed
this issue.
The case arises in an environmental challenge to the manage-
ment of Bureau of Lands Management lands in wilderness study
areas.The Federal Land Policy and Management Act requires the
BLM to manage wilderness study areas “in a manner so as not to
impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as wilder-
ness.”The BLM’s regulations implementing this requirement in
essence prohibit the use of off-road vehicles in WSAs.Here the
environmentalists brought suit alleging that the BLM had failed
to carry out this mandatory,nondiscretionary duty and sought
an order compelling action unlawfully withheld.
The government denied that this was a case under § 706(1),
arguing that there was no “agency action,” including no failure
to act within the meaning of § 551(13), and that the case was
really a challenge to the ongoing management of the area for
which the APA does not provide judicial review in the absence
Supreme Court 
News
1 Professor of Law,Lewis & Clark Law School; Section Chair; and
Contributing Editor. continued on page 25
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By William S. Jordan III1
When does Chevron apply? If it doesn’t, what is the
nature of Skidmore deference?
The Circuits have continued to struggle with the question of
whether Chevron deference applies to particular agency statutory
interpretations. In U.S.v.Mead, the Supreme Court explained
that Chevron deference applies “when it appears that Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carry-
ing the force of law,and that the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” In
so doing, the Court said that a requirement for relatively formal
procedures such as notice and comment was a good indication
that Congress intended the courts to defer to a particular agency
interpretation.The fundamental question,however, is not the
nature of the process implemented by the agency,but whether
the relevant considerations, including agency process, indicate
that Congress intended Chevron-style deference to apply to the
interpretation at issue.
In reviewing an EPA interpretation reached through informal
rulemaking, the Fifth Circuit recently truncated the delegation
inquiry by characterizing the test as whether “the agency’s deci-
sion is a result of a sufficiently formal and deliberative process to
warrant deference. . . .”BCCA Appeal Group v.U.S.EPA,348
F.3d 93,100 (5th Cir.2003).Noting that EPA had acted through
“a formal process,” the court applied Chevron deference. In most
cases, this shorthand approach will make no difference to the
outcome. It is important to understand,however, that the mere
use of – or failure to use – formal procedures in reaching a statu-
tory interpretation does not determine whether Chevron
deference is due.Other indicators of congressional intent may
be used to argue for or against Chevron deference regardless of
the procedures used by the agency.
Two recent decisions involving the IRS demonstrate that
agency use of “a formal process” such as informal rulemaking is
not necessary to support Chevron deference.A third raises the
question of the nature of Skidmore deference when Chevron does
not apply. In Alfaro v.Commissioner,2003 WL 22509403 (5th Cir.
2003), the Fifth Circuit granted Chevron deference to an inter-
pretation stated in a Treasury Regulation that had been issued
without notice and comment. It is not clear,however,why the
court applied Chevron.The IRS had argued that deference was
due under the multifactor test of Barnhart v.Walton despite the
failure to pursue notice and comment.Without engaging in
such an analysis or otherwise explaining itself, the court simply
stated that the interpretation had to be sustained if it was reason-
able.We cannot tell why the court applied Chevron deference in
this circumstance.From the opinion, it seems likely that the
strength of the agency’s interpretive argument rendered insignif-
icant the fine details of deference analysis.
In Hospital Corporation of America and Subsidiaries v.Commis-
sioner,348 F.3d 136 (6th Cir.2003), the Sixth Circuit similarly
granted Chevron deference to a Treasury Regulation that had
been issued without notice and comment. In that case,however,
the court addressed the distinct issue of whether Chevron defer-
ence was due where the interpretation had been issued pursuant
to “general authority to ‘prescribe all needful rules and regula-
tions for the enforcement’of the Internal Revenue Code,”
rather than under an express statutory provision granting
authority to implement particular sections of the Code.Citing
the Supreme Court’s decision in Boeing Company v.United States,
537 U.S.437 (2003), the court held that general rulemaking
authority was sufficient to constitute an implicit delegation that
would support Chevron deference.
Finally, the Sixth Circuit in Aeroquip–Vickers, Inc. v.Commis-
sioner,347 F.3d 173 (6th Cir.2003),grappled with the degree of
deference due to an interpretation embodied in a Revenue
Ruling. In a 2–1 decision reversing an 11–6 decision by the Tax
Court, the majority and dissent agreed that the ruling was not
entitled to Chevron deference.They seem to have disagreed as to
the nature of Skidmore deference.Despite holding that Skidmore
deference applied, the majority characterized the IRS’s interpre-
tation as “entirely reasonable,” seemingly reflecting Chevron.The
majority then explicitly applied Skidmore deference,upholding
the interpretation because the agency’s interpretation was
persuasive and because this “longstanding interpretation of [the
agency’s] own regulations,”deserved “substantial judicial defer-
ence.”The dissent argued that the majority had overstated the
degree of deference due to a Revenue Ruling.Emphasizing that
“the level of respect afforded the agency pronouncement [under
Skidmore] depends on its ‘power to persuade,’” the dissent found
the agency’s analysis to be wanting.While the majority applied
something of a multifactor analysis by considering the long-
standing nature of the agency interpretation, the dissent seems to
be saying that Skidmore requires nothing more than a determina-
tion of whether the agency’s argument is persuasive.
7th Circuit on Buckhannon, the IDEA, and
“prevailing party” status for the purpose of
attorney fee awards
The Seventh Circuit joined the Second and Third Circuits in
holding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckhannon Bd.&
Care Home v.W.Va.Dep’t of Health & Human Res.,532 U.S.598
(2001) applies to the fee-shifting provision of the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). In so doing, the court
articulated a presumption in favor of Buckhannon’s applicability
to statutory fee shifting provisions that award fees to a “prevailing
party.” It also held that a party who achieves success through a
private settlement of litigation does not qualify as a “prevailing
party”under Buckhannon.
1 Professor of Law,University of Akron Law School;Vice Chair Judicial
Review Committee; and Contributing Editor.
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Buckhannon involved litigation that was rendered moot when
a state legislature repealed provisions of state law that had been
challenged under the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA)
and of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).Both statutes
awarded attorney fees to the “prevailing party.”The Supreme
Court refused to apply the “catalyst theory,”holding that the
term “prevailing party”was a term of art under which the liti-
gant must achieve success in the litigation itself,generally taken
to mean either by prevailing on the merits or by obtaining a
judicially sanctioned consent decree.
In T.D.v.La Grange School District No.102,2003 WL 22682466
(7th Cir.2003), the plaintiff arguably achieved success in the liti-
gation itself by reaching a settlement agreement that provided a
substantial financial recovery and the sort of school placement
originally sought by the plaintiff.The District Court held that
Buckhannon did not apply to this case because the IDEA included
various limitations on recovery that rendered it distinct from
other “prevailing party” fee shifting statutes.The Seventh Circuit
reversed on this point,but it refused to adopt a blanket rule that
Buckhannon would apply to all “prevailing fee” statutes.Recog-
nizing that the “‘text, structure,or legislative history’of a
particular fee-shifting statute [might] indicate that the term
“prevailing party” in that statute is not meant to have its usual
meaning,” the court held that “there is a strong presumption that
Buckhannon applies to each fee-shifting statute that awards fees to
“prevailing parties.”Thus, the court left open a rather narrow
door for arguments that the catalyst theory is available under
some fee-shifting statutes that use the term “prevailing party.”
Having held Buchannon applicable to the IDEA, the court
then denied attorney fee recovery for the District Court case
because the litigation had been resolved through a private settle-
ment agreement,without the imprimatur of the court through a
consent decree or otherwise.The fact that the court had been
heavily involved in the settlement negotiations was not a suffi-
cient “judicial imprimatur” to render the plaintiff a “prevailing
party”under the IDEA.Rather,“[t]here must be some official
judicial approval of the settlement and some level of continuing
judicial oversight.”
Two additional points are worth noting with respect to this
opinion.First, although the plaintiff did not recover fees for the
District Court litigation, it did qualify as a “prevailing party”
with respect to the administrative due process hearing before the
agency.Because the plaintiff had achieved success “on certain
significant issues and achieved at least some of the benefit he
sought,”he was entitled to recover attorney fees related to the
administrative hearing.Second, the court rejected a request to
recover expert witness fees under statutory language allowing
recover of “attorney fees as part of costs.”Despite legislative
history clearly supporting expert witness fee recovery, this statu-
tory language did not qualify as the explicit authority that
Supreme Court precedent requires to support recovery of
expert witness fees.
Safety regulation of oil tankers as a taking of
property – Federal Circuit accepts the possibility
but holds no taking on the particular facts
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 requires that all newly constructed
marine vessels capable of carrying petroleum products be build
with double hulls. It also requires that all existing single-hull oil
tank vessels be retired from service or retrofitted with double
hulls according to a retirement schedule that began in 1995.
Maritrans, Inc., the owner of several such vessels,argued that
these restrictions constituted a taking of its property interest in its
many single-hulled vessels. In Maritrans, Inc.v.U.S., 342 F.3d 1344
(Fed.Cir.2003), the Federal Circuit denied the particular claim,
but it left the door open for similar claims with respect to the
effect of regulations upon highly regulated personal property.
Maritrans claimed that the OPA restrictions constituted a
categorical “total taking”of the value of the vessels following
their forced retirement dates.The United States argued that
categorical takings analysis does not apply to personal property,
that there can be no property interest in operating on the navi-
gable waters, and that the transport of oil is a nuisance that can
be closely regulated without triggering takings analysis.The
Federal Circuit rejected all of these claims.
As to the government’s arguments, the court held that Mari-
trans had a property interest in the barges themselves,not in
their operation on the navigable waters.Thus, federal regulation
of the barges could constitute a taking of property.
As to the takings claim, the court held that it could not sepa-
rately consider the time after retirement of the vessels as a
categorical total loss of value. Instead, it must consider all of the
remaining use of the vessels,both before and after retirement.
Since the vessels retained some use value prior to retirement and
some market value and insurance recovery value, the facts did
not present a categorical taking.
Once Maritrans had been relegated to Penn Central takings
analysis, it had little chance of success.With only a 13% drop in
value overall, and a public need favoring the regulation,Mari-
trans could not show a sufficient diminution in value or other
imposition to establish a taking.This was particularly true
where Maritrans had not been a specific target of government
action,but the loss had been spread through the entire oil vessel
industry.
9th Circuit – NEPA challenge to state water
management program is ripe despite absence of
site-specific decisions – discussion of standing
under NEPA – other ripeness and standing decisions
Various state and federal agencies are cooperating to create and
implement the CALFED program,which they describe as “the
largest,most complex water management program in the
continued on next page
Administrative and Regulatory Law News Volume 29, Number 222
world,”engaged in “the most complex and extensive ecosystem
restoration project ever proposed.”As part of that effort,
CALFED prepared a programmatic environmental impact state-
ment,which identified a preferred alternative under which there
would be significant changes to the allocation of water resources
in the area.Plaintiffs, farmers who alleged they would be
adversely affected by the plan,challenged the EIS on various
grounds.
The District Court rejected the challenge as unripe under the
principles of Ohio Forestry Ass’n v.Sierra Club,523 U.S.726
(1998),essentially because any specific site-specific actions
would require further analysis and decision.The Ninth Circuit
reversed in Laub v.US Department of the Interior,342 F.3d 1080
(9th Cir.2003).
Emphasizing the difference between the substantive challenge
at issue in Ohio Forestry Association and a procedural challenge
under NEPA, the court held that a challenge to a programmatic
impact statement is ripe at the time the statement is issued.The
reason is twofold.First, the court cited Ohio Forestry Ass’n itself
for the proposition that NEPA,unlike a substantive statute,
“simply guarantees a particular procedure,not a particular
result....Hence a person with standing who is injured by a
failure to comply with the NEPA procedure may complain of
that failure at the time the failure takes place, for the claim can
never get riper.”Second, the court emphasized that the practice
of tiering environmental impact statements means that some
issues are resolved at the more general,programmatic, stage.
These issues guide further decisionmaking and will not be
reopened when site-specific analyses are performed.Thus, a
NEPA challenge may be ripe at a relatively early,general stage of
analysis,while a substantive forest plan will not be ripe for chal-
lenge until a decision is made with respect to a particular
site-specific activity.
The Laub opinion also includes a useful discussion of standing
under NEPA.The important point is that the plaintiffs must
identify a substantive environmental harm to support standing,
not merely the procedural harm of failure to prepare an
adequate EIS.Where a plaintiff alleges such a substantive harm,
the traceability and redressability requirements are somewhat
relaxed due to the inherently indirect effect of NEPA analysis on
substantive decisions.Also, in this case the government did not
raise standing issues until the appellate stage of the litigation.
While a jurisdictional question such as constitutional standing
may be raised at any stage, the court refused to hear the govern-
ment’s argument that the plaintiffs were not within the zone of
interests of the statute.Having failed to raise this prudential point
earlier, the government had waived it.
Two other ripeness decisions are worthy of note.The first,
Maritrans, Inc. v.U.S.,342 F.3d 1344 (Fed.Cir.2003),discussed
above with respect to the takings claim,originally involved some
37 vessels.The Court of Federal Claims held that the claim was
not ripe with respect to 29 vessels that had not yet been sold,
refitted,or scrapped in reliance upon the provisions of the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990.Maritrans pressed its ripeness claim with
respect to seven vessels whose retirement dates had been defini-
tively established by the OPA.Since the OPA effectively
reduced the value of those vessels prior to their actual retirement
date, there was a present injury.No further government action
was necessary to make the claim ripe for review.The second
decision is The University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey v.
Corrigan, 347 F.3d 57 (3d Cir.2003), in which a medical school
sought to challenge the initiation of an audit by the Inspector
General of the Department of Health and Human Services.By
its nature, the initiation of an audit is not a “definitive position”
of an agency,nor does it represent the culmination of the deci-
sion making process. It is merely the initiation of agency process.
However unwise, it is not ripe for judicial review.Interestingly,
the concurring opinion would have dismissed the action on the
ground that an Inspector General’s decision to initiate an audit is
a matter “committed to agency discretion by law,”and thus
unreviewable under Section 701(a) (2) of the APA.
As to standing, see also Ranger Cellular v.FCC,2003 WL
22681318 (D.C.Cir.2003) (no redressability where challenger
sought a new auction of cellular telephone licenses,but
conceded that its chances of prevailing in an auction were
“virtually nil”); and Consumer Federation of America v.FCC,2003
WL 22461433 (D.C.Cir.2003) (standing found where FCC
order could provide redress).
Various decisions on access to judicial review
Several decisions addressed timing and other barriers to judicial
review of agency decisions. In Roberts v.US Railroad Retirement
Board,346 F.3d 139 (5th Cir.2003), for example, the Fifth
Circuit took sides in a circuit split on the reviewability of a
refusal to reopen an earlier claim denial.Roberts had first filed
and lost a disability claim before the agency.He did not chal-
lenge that decision.He later filed and won a disability claim.At
that point,he asked the agency to reopen its earlier denial.When
the agency refused,he sought judicial review.The Fifth Circuit
denied review on the ground Roberts had not sought review by
the statutory deadline for review of the original decision.To
allow review of a later refusal to reopen would eviscerate the
statutory time limit.This decision, joining the Fourth,Sixth,
Seventh,and Tenth Circuits, contrasts with the position of the
Second and Eight Circuits.The latter would allow review of the
reopening denial to determine whether there had been an abuse
of discretion.
Two decisions addressed fine points of filing dates.Consumer
Electronics Association v.FCC,347 F.3d 291 (D.C.Cir.2003),
involved a challenge to a rule issued by the FCC.Eager to get to
court, the CEA filed its action on the very day the rule was
issued.Relying on its own rule providing that “first day to be
counted when a period of time begins with an action taken by
continued on page 27
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Can Legally Significant Government Action Avoid
APA Rulemaking Requirements? Well...Maybe
By Michael Asimow1
The rulemaking provisions of California’s APA are overbroad.
They apply to virtually every form of agency quasi-legislative
action, including interpretive rules and policy statements.Yet
California’s rulemaking procedure is costly and cumbersome
(involving multiple notices, statements,hearings, findings, and
review of the rule by the Office of Administrative Law).When
compliance with APA rulemaking requirements would have
disruptive effects on government, the courts sometimes invent
ways around the law,as occurred in Pacific Gas & Electric
Co.(PG&E) v.State Dep’t of Water Resources (DWR),5
Cal.Rptr.3d 283 (Ct.App.2003).
The background of the PG&E case was California’s energy
crisis of 2001.Since the sudden spike in energy costs had forced
California’s private utilities into (or close to) bankruptcy, the
legislature required DWR to purchase power and resell it to the
utilities.DWR had to submit a “revenue requirement” to the
Public Utilities Commission;before doing so it had to conduct a
“review” to determine whether the costs included in its revenue
requirement were “just and reasonable.”This determination
established the prices for energy to be sold in the future that
would allow DWR to recoup its outlays.The question is
whether DWR’s “review”was a “regulation” that could only be
adopted after compliance with the APA.
The just and reasonable review seemed to meet the statute’s
broad definition of a “regulation” (which boils down to any
agency statement of general application that implements or
interprets law).The “just and reasonable” review was normative
in nature (not merely an arithmetical calculation), and its result
would be the imposition of costs on utilities and the general
public for years to come.
Nevertheless, the court wisely held that the APA was inappli-
cable (although it was difficult for the court to explain exactly
why not).California’s byzantine rulemaking statute imposes
bureaucratic costs on government agencies that sometimes
exceed the public benefits of that procedure.The reality is that
the “review” in the PG&E case just doesn’t look or feel like a
“regulation”as we understand the term.The decision is a
welcome recognition that not every legally significant step a
government agency takes should be subjected to rulemaking
procedure.
Automatic Drug Testing of Drivers Involved in
Accidents? Not So Fast
By Lois Oakley2
Georgia’s highest court has determined that a provision of the
state’s implied consent statute violates constitutional protection
against unreasonable search and seizure.The case examined a
head-on collision in which one driver sustained serious injuries.
These injuries caused the police to seek to collect blood samples
from both drivers pursuant to Georgia’s implied consent law.
This statute provides:
The State of Georgia considers that any person who operates a
motor vehicle . . . throughout this state shall be deemed to have given
consent . . . to a chemical test . . .of his or her blood,breath,urine,or
other bodily substances for the purpose of determining the presence
of alcohol or any other drug . . . if such person is involved in any traffic
accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities.OCGA 40-5-55(a).
The reviewing court concluded that the implied consent law
was unconstitutional since it authorized a search and seizure
without probable cause.Although the state’s interest in safe-
guarding its highways from impaired drivers was indisputable,
the court reasoned that this interest was not the primary purpose
of the implied consent law.Rather, it determined that the
primary purpose was “to gather evidence for criminal prosecu-
tion.” It wrote:
“No matter how important that purpose [gathering evidence]
may be, it does not create a special need to depart from the Fourth
Amendment’s requirement of probable cause;otherwise it could be
argued that the State’s interest in securing evidence in any situation
of potentially serious criminal conduct would justify dispensing
with any finding of probable cause.”
Cooper v.State,2003 Ga.LEXIS 842;2003 Fulton County D.
Rep.3004 (October,2003).
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Adopts Capricious
Disregard Standard of Review of Agency
Adjudication
By John Gedid3
In Wintermyer v.Workers Compensation Appeal Board,571 Pa.189,
812 A.2d 478 (2002), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted
the capricious disregard standard of review for agency adjudica-
tion.This standard may be raised in all appeals, even though the
language of the Pennsylvania Administrative Agency Law does
not mention that standard.
In Wintermyer, a workers compensation ALJ disbelieved
claimant’s physician witness on causation of claimant’s carpal
tunnel syndrome.The reason for disbelieving the witness was the
testimony of a supervisor that the claimant had very limited
computer keyboarding duties.Both the Workers Compensation
1 Professor of Law Emeritus,UCLA Law School;Council Member; and
Contributing Editor
2 Chief State ALJ,Georgia Office of State Administrative Hearings.
3 Professor of Law,Widener University School of Law. continued on page 27
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T he 2003 Administrative Conference was, as notedelsewhere in this issue of the News, a great success.Part of that success stems from the presentation of
programs on matters that will occupy the Section’s atten-
tion beyond the conference - matters in which the
Section finds itself contributing to the dialogue:OMB’s
proposed peer review requirement,EU regulation, and
interstate compact procedure.
Peer Review
The peer review panel was convened to discuss the Office
of Management and Budget’s proposed draft Bulletin on
“Peer Review and Information Quality.”68 Fed.Reg.
54023 (2003).Panelists included program co-chairs Kansas
Law School Professor Sidney Shapiro and Cadwalader,
Wickersham & Taft partner Fred Anderson, along with
Science Magazine Deputy Editor Brooks Hanson,U.S.
Chamber of Commerce VP Bill Kovacs, and OIRA counselor
Paul Noe.
Later, the Section Council debated the contents of a proposed
draft letter commenting on the agency’s proposal.Although the
proposed comments were not, strictly speaking, the product of
the panelists’comments,no doubt the
program helped inform the debate that
ensued before the Council.
One area of concern to council
members was which rules would be subject
to the new peer review requirement.The
general consensus was that the benefit of
subjecting major rules to peer review, those
with an impact of a $100 million or more,
would likely equal or exceed the burden
on agencies in terms of added resource
consumption and delay.At the same time,
the $100 million trigger would offer an objective standard for
determining when peer review should apply.
An amended version of the draft comment letter was later
circulated to and approved by Council members.The comments
express the Section’s support for OMB’s efforts to ensure the
quality of the information disseminated by the federal govern-
ment.The comments also note that official ABA policy urges
that the “nature, significance,and complexity of the risk assess-
ment should dictate when peer review is used and the nature
and scope of peer review.”ABA Resolution on Risk Assessment
(October 1999) (available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/
risk02.pdf).Accordingly, the comments suggest allowing agen-
cies to forgo peer review when the information that would be
reviewed “is neither controversial nor seriously disputed.”The
comments argue that “quantitative measures, such as the
$100,000,000 threshold,are considerably more reliable and
manageable as triggers for required peer reviews than qualitative
standards whose language,however framed, is likely to invite
uncertainty and argument.”
The comments also offer improvements for the peer review
and correction process and call for “review of the process that
[OMB] implements after the expiration of an appropriate
period of time, such as five years.”At the time of this article’s
writing, the Section was seeking permission to submit its
comments under the ABA’s blanket authority rules.
EU Project
Boyden Gray’s paper from the program on “Understanding the
E.U.Regulatory Process”appears elsewhere in this issue of the
News and succinctly demonstrates the need for a probing and
exhaustive examination of the regulatory process under the Euro-
pean Union.Excerpts of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s
keynote remarks,also included in this issue,amplify Gray’s
concerns about a lack of transparency in process and highlight the
enormous stakes for the U.S.and its international trading partners.
The program was the first of several conferences planned for
the Section’s project on European Union administrative law. In
addition to Gray,program panelists included Program chair
George A.Bermann,Walter Gellhorn Professor of Law and
Jean Monnet Professor of European Union Law,Columbia
University School of Law School;Theodore “Ted”
Kassinger,General Counsel,U.S.Department of Commerce;
and Peter Berz,First Secretary,Trade Section,Delegation of the
European Commission.
Bermann later addressed the Council on the design phase of
the project.Reminiscent of the Section’s APA project,EU
project output would include a black letter statement of Euro-
pean Union administrative law,which would be reviewed and
discussed at transatlantic conferences or symposia before finaliza-
tion.A prescriptive phase is also contemplated, resulting in
perhaps a comparison between US and EU regulatory processes
for the purposes of transatlantic regulatory cooperation and/or
trade disputes avoidance and resolution.
Section News
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Interstate Compact Project
The Section’s Interstate Compact APA project got under-
way with a program on “Administrative Procedure and
Interstate Compacts.”The program was organized by
project co-chairs and program panelists Utah legal policy
consultant Kent Bishop and News editor Bill Morrow.
Other panelists included project members Ron Levin,
Henry Hitchcock Professor of Law,Washington Univer-
sity in St.Louis, and 2000–01 Section Chair; and Rick
Masters,General Counsel, Interstate Commission for
Adult Offender Supervision.Papers from three of the
panelists are reproduced in this issue of the News,albeit as
revised by the authors after the program ended.
Interstate compacts are an effective tool for structuring
interstate relationships, regulating private activity that tran-
scends state lines and furnishing government services on a
regional basis.They offer an alternative to federal involvement
and are particularly apt for matters traditionally addressed by
states, such as law enforcement and public health, safety and
welfare.Some 190 interstate agreements are currently in place.
Interstate compact agencies generally are not considered
federal agencies within the scope of the federal APA,are not
generally subject to state APAs,and in some states are expressly
excluded from the scope of the state’s APA.Some recent
compacts have incorporated APA-like provisions,but the prac-
tice is hardly uniform.
Approximately forty volunteers have signed on to research
case law and literature, survey compacts and compact agencies,
and compare and contrast the federal APA with the Model State
APA.The goal of the project is to produce a set of administrative
procedure guidelines that could be adopted as ABA policy and
applied to or adopted by compact agencies.The project is
expected to take two to three years.
Bill Morrow, Kent Bishop, Ron Levin & Rick Masters
of a discrete agency action,citing Lujan v.National Wildlife Feder-
ation,497 U.S.871 (1990).The Tenth Circuit disagreed. It held
that there was an allegation that the BLM had failed to take a
mandatory, required action,and this was, therefore, a claim of
agency inaction,which is all that is required to bring a claim
under § 706(1).To the extent that the agency claimed it was
managing the area, the court said this would go to the merits of
the claim,not the jurisdiction of the court to consider it.
The immediate impact of this case will be with regard to
environmental suits involving agency management of public
lands,where a claim that the agency has failed to fulfill a manda-
tory duty has been one of the few ways to challenge
management activities.See also Montana Wilderness Ass’n.v.United
States Forest Serv.,314 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir.2003)(upholding a §
706(1) claim).But see Sierra Club v.Peterson,228 F.3d 559 (5th
Cir.2000) (en banc)(holding that alleged agency failure to
comply with the National Forest Management Act did not
amount to a failure to act justifying review under § 706(1)).
More generally,however, the Court’s initial foray into this area
may well have ramifications beyond this set of cases.
Supreme Court News
continued from page 19
SECTION OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
IN NEW YORK
The American Bar Association Section of
Dispute Resolution Sixth Annual Spring
Conference,entitled Resolution and Resilience, will
occur in New York City at the Sheraton Hotel
April 15–17 and feature the presentation of the
D’Alemberte/Raven Award to Amb.Richard
Holbrooke
Amb.Stuart Eizenstat former U.S.Secretary of
the Treasury will speak about his efforts to achieve
justice for Holocaust victims and families.
Stay tuned to our web site for full conference
details: www.abanet.org/dispute/conference/
6th/home.html.
By Yvette M. Barksdale1,2
Kimberly D.Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure
of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH.U.L.QUARTERLY 487
(2003).
In this article, the author critiques the efficacy of legal standards
that reduce or eliminate enterprise liability for organizations
who have “internal compliance structures” such as corporate
ethics codes of conduct and accompanying internal compliance
procedures.The author discusses the history of such internal
compliance structures,beginning with their use within the
United States Sentencing Commission’s “Organizational
Sentence Guidelines”and their subsequent proliferation into a
variety of areas, including employment discrimination law.The
author also surveys and critiques extant empirical research into
the efficacy of such internal compliance structures.The author
argues that little evidence exists for the assumption that such
codes of conduct and other internal compliance structures, in
fact reduce the incidence of prohibited conduct within the
organization.Rather, the author concludes, a growing body of
evidence indicates that such compliance structures largely serve
as “window dressing”which provides market legitimacy and
reduced liability for the firms.Moreover, such structures have
adverse consequences, including under-deterrence of corporate
misconduct and a proliferation of costly,but arguably ineffective,
internal compliance structures.
The author attributes the popularity of such internal compliance
structures, to a trend toward “negotiated”or “cooperative gover-
nance”models,which involve the regulated group and other
interested parties in the governance process.The author, adopt-
ing an “Incomplete Contracts Governance Theory,”concludes
that although such negotiated governance models provide
descriptive insights into legal regulatory processes, the models
underestimate the ability of regulated parties and their lawyers to
subvert the negotiated policies by renegotiating “outs” to the
policies in the subsequent implementation and enforcement
phases of the policies.The author argues such successful subver-
sion is predicted by the Incomplete Contract Governance
Theory.
Mary K.Olson, Pharmaceutical Policy Change and the Safety
of New Drugs, 45 J. L.& ECON. 615 (2002).
This article describes an empirical study of whether statutorily
mandated acceleration in the speed of Food and Drug Adminis-
tration’s (FDA) new -drug approvals have adversely affected new
drug safety.Olson’s study,which analyzed adverse drug reaction
(ADR) data from 141 FDA “new chemical entity”approvals
between 1990 and 1995,concludes that “reductions in new-
drug review times are associated with increases in both adverse
drug reactions (ADRs) requiring hospitalization and ADRs
resulting in death.“ Olson argues that adverse drug reaction data
is a better measures of drug safety than the number of with-
drawn drugs, analyzed by others.Olson’s results indicated that a
one month reduction in a drug’s review time is associated with a
one percent increase in expected reports of ADR hospitaliza-
tions and a two percent increase in expected reports of ADR
deaths.The mean 12 month reduction in a drug’s FDA review
time is associated on average with an increase of 10.92 ADR
hospitalizations and 7.68 deaths.
Olson argues for new techniques to reduce the adverse safety
effects of speedier new drug processes.Olson notes,however,
that despite the increase in adverse drug reactions,consumers
may still have net benefits,on the whole,because of the
increased health benefits of earlier access to life saving new
drugs.The author concludes that more empirical research is
necessary to determine this.
Howard M.Wasserman, The Trouble with Shadow Govern-
ment, 52 EMORY L. J. 281 (2003).
In this article,Professor Wasserman discusses the issue of presi-
dential, legislative and executive branch succession in the event
of catastrophic terrorist or other attack.Professor Wasserman
critiques the shadow government currently in place post 9/11 as
a good idea in concept,but one which is impracticable in prac-
tice because it does not provide for a clear line of succession for
the political branches consistent with Constitutional require-
ments (as apparently structured based upon the limited public
information available).Professor Wasserman recommends
constitutional and statutory revisions to provide a quick recon-
stitution of the political branches of the government in a
manner which adheres to separation of powers, federalism and
democratic principles.
Daniel J.Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity,
2002 SUP.CT.REV. 343 (2002).
In this article,Professor Meltzer contrasts the Supreme Court’s
relative judicial activism in the statutory preemption area with the
Court’s corresponding “judicial passivity” in statutory interpreta-
tion.Meltzer argues that the Court, through textualist
interpretation,“refuse[s] to take the responsibility for shaping a
workable legal system” for resolving everyday disputes.Meltzer
analyzes four statutory interpretation cases in which,he argues,the
Supreme Court’s constricted conception of the judicial role in
statutory interpretation as avoiding “judicial lawmaking,” impairs
the Court’s ability to sensibly decide real-life disputes.These cases
include Great-West Life and Annuity Insurance Company v.
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Appeals Board and the intermediate appellate court,Common-
wealth Court, reversed,holding that the ALJ capriciously
disregarded competent evidence of a physician.The Supreme
Court reversed Commonwealth Court on the basis that the
capricious disregard standard is available,but that the lower
courts had misapplied the standard.
In a severely divided set of concurring opinions, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court held that the capricious disregard standard
could be raised in all cases, even those in which both sides
present evidence.A majority of the court reasoned that the “in
accordance with law” language of Pennsylvania’s Administrative
Agency Law § 704 furnishes authority for this standard of judi-
cial review.The court explained that an agency’s conclusions of
law must be supported by sufficient,competent findings of fact.
The capricious disregard standard assures that objective by
examining the adequacy and competence of factual support for
agency conclusions.The court was badly divided over the exact
definition of capricious disregard and how it should be applied
in particular cases.However, the justices were unanimous in
concluding that this standard:1) will result in reversal only in the
most exceptional circumstances;2) will generally apply only to
negative agency findings and conclusions; and 3) will require, in
employing it,particular care not to interfere with the substantial
evidence standard of review or the power of the ALJ to make
credibility determinations.
the Commission is the day after the day on which public notice
of that action is given,” the FCC argued that the CEA’s chal-
lenge had to be dismissed because it had been filed too early.
While the FCC lawyers might get credit for creativity, the court
rejected the FCC’s position as contrary to common sense.The
court held that the rule does not establish the period within
which review may be sought.Rather, it provides a means of
determining the deadline by which review must be sought.
At the other end of the filing period,Public Citizen had “59
days after the order is issued” to challenge a rule issued by the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.Public Citizen
filed its action within 59 days of the date the rule was filed with
the Federal Register and available for public inspection.
NHTSA argued,however, that the filing was late because it was
more than 59 days after the agency had issued the rule, appar-
ently meaning the date when the agency had signed and thereby
promulgated the rule. In Public Citizen v.Mineta,343 F.3d 1159
(9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit found the challenge to be
timely. In so doing, it found the agency’s interpretation of its
own regulation to be unreasonable.The court held that the
period for review must run from the point at which the agency
action is publicly available,not some earlier point when it is still
hidden from view.
Ruud v.US DOL,347 F.3d 10086 (9th Cir.2003), involved a
whistleblower claim under two distinct statutes, the Clean Air
Act (CAA) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation,and Liability Act (CERCLA).Since the CAA
provided for immediate review in the Court of Appeals,while
CERCLA provided for review in the District Court, the issue
was whether the Ninth Circuit could consider the entire claim.
Emphasizing considerations of judicial economy and efficiency,
the court joined several other circuits in holding that the appel-
late court could hear both claims in a single proceeding.
Knudson, 122 S.CT.708 (2002), in which the Court inter-
preted ERISA to essentially render a wide range of subrogation
clauses unenforceable.Meltzer argues the resulting uncertain
enforceability of subrogation rights will likely discourage ERISA
benefit plans from paying beneficiaries,a result that the Supreme
Court could have avoided with a more purposive interpretation.
Meltzer also discusses Norfolk Shipbuilding and Drydock v.
Garris, 532 U.S. 811 (2001),United States v.Oakland
Cannabis Buyers’Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483 (2001), and
Correctional Services Corp.v.Malesko, 122 S.CT.515 (2001).
In contrast,Meltzer argues, the Court’s preemption cases go far
beyond textual directives when interpreting federal statutes to
preempt state and local law, sometimes preempting even when
Congress has enacted narrower express preemption clauses.
These preemption decisions also conflict with the Court’s
protection of states’ rights in other areas, such as state govern-
mental immunities.Meltzer argues the Court should take a
more active judicial role in statutory interpretation because
Congress lacks institutional competence to foresee all possible
contingencies and to muster the necessary time,attention and
political will to correct deficient statutes. In contrast, the
Supreme Court may have institutional advantages for resolving
interpretive problems arising from its case by case approach,
which is moored to the context of individual disputes.To
support this view of the proper judicial role,Meltzer discusses
problems of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U. S.C. §1367
(2003), and the retroactivity of the 1996 amendments to habeas
corpus jurisdiction in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, PUB. L.NO. 104-132, 110 STAT. 1214
(1996).
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